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PREFACE
Over the past three years, the Government of Sri Lanka has made an extraordinary effort
to deepen its understanding of the nature and root causes of poverty in Sri Lanka, with a view to
reassessing and reformulating its policy framework for reducing poverty. This report is a
contribution to the development of this new poverty reduction strategy for Sri Lanka. It also
informs the World Bank's upcoming Country Assistance Strategy for Sri Lanka. The report,
which builds on the 1995 World Bank Poverty Assessment, is the product of close collaboration
between the Government of Sri Lanka, the World Bank, several development partners, and Sri
Lankan academics and researchers. The concept note was shared and discussed with the
Government, and some of the early analytical work that underpins the analysis was carried out in
collaboration with and was utilized by the Government in its 2000 Framework for Poverty
Reduction paper. In addition, findings of this report were discussed broadly with the
government, the research community, and NGOs at three workshops held in Sri Lanka in 2000
and 2001.
This report was initiated in March 2000 and was prepared by a multi-sectoral World
Bank team led by Manuela Ferro, Senior Economist, under the guidance of Eric Bell and Tercan
Baysan, Lead Economists. The report draws on contributions from: Elena Glinskaya (Samurdhi),
Eric Bell, Rapti Goonesekere and Salvatore Schiavo Campo (public sector management), Sryiani
Hulugalle and Iffath Sharif (consultant, microfinance), Valerie Kozel (design of the Sri Lanka
Integrated Survey, SLIS), Uwe Deichman (poverty and service delivery maps), Daya
Samarasinghe (health), Jean-Claude Balcet, Terrence Abeysekera, and Geeta Sethi (agricultural
policy), Harsha Aturupane (education and design of SLIS), Naresha Duraiswami (private sector
development), Princess Ventura (research assistance and conflict issues), Barbara Parker
(consultant, qualitative analysis of poverty), Beatriz Godoy and Xun Wu (consultants, SLIS),
Sasanka Perera (formerly with the World Bank, currently U. Colombo, conflict), and Shunalini
Sarkar (final editing and formatting).
The report benefited greatly from collaborative work with Sri Lankan institutions and
researchers, including: Dileni Gunewardena (University of Peradenyia, analysis of 1990/91 and
1995/96 Department of Census and Statistics data), Nisha Arunatilake (Institute of Policy
Studies, health outcomes), K. Tudor Silva (University of Peradenyia, qualitative analysis), Upul
Sonnadara (University of Colombo, SLIS processing), and the staff of the Sri Lanka Business
Development Center, which carried out collection of the Sri Lanka-Integrated Survey.
The peer reviewers were: Gaurav Datt and Gunnar Eskeland. The team also received
useful comments on the analysis of poverty programs and safety nets from Margaret Grosh and
on the analysis of microfinance programs from Gerard Caprio. Sadiq Ahmed, Edgardo Favaro,
Emmanuel Jimenez, Tercan Baysan, Mark Sundberg, Tara Vishwanath, Dina Umali-Deininger,
Gajan Pathmanathan, Miriam Witana, Hugo Diaz-Etchevehere, Deborah Bateman, Kenichi
Ohashi, Mariana Todorova, and Valerie Kozel, who led the early stages of the work, provided
useful input at different stages of the report.

EXECUTIVE SUMMALRY
Sri Lanka has led developing nations in recognizing the importance of health and
education for development. Sri Lanka now boasts social indicators more in line with those of a
developed nation than those of a country in which per capita income is just US$800. Successive
governments have maintained the country's emphasis on universal health and education and built
on the high level of human capital inherited at independence. Universal and free health and
education services, and focus on gender equality and the education of women have been
permanent features of Sri Lanka's social policies over several decades. These remarkable
achievements have meant higher levels of well-being for all Sri Lankans, and have considerably
reduced non income poverty.
Less clear is Sri Lanka's success in reducing income poverty. In analyzing the nature
and causes of income poverty in Sri Lanka, three questions come to mind:
* Why has Sri Lanka's considerable economic advance over Korea, Thailand, and
Malaysia in the 1 960s turned negative in more recent times, and significantly so?
* Why has poverty in Colombo and the rest of the Western Province fallen rapidly and
to a relatively low level, whereas it remained high in other parts of the country?
* Have the large resources and prominence Sri Lanka has given to redistributive
programs really help reduce poverty?
A simple answer to these questions is Sri Lanka's hesitant embrace of progressive
economic and social policies. Such policies would have lead to: (a) withdrawal of the state from
all areas where the private sector can be more efficient and removal of regulations hindering the
effective functioning of markets, with a view to evolving a policy framework that supports
creation of opportunities; (b) focusing the state on the provision of much needed infrastructure
and social services that the private sector cannot provide; (c) social policies accommodating
diversity - ethnic, linguistic, political, religious - and understanding among different groups,
providing fair and transparent access to resources and opportunities, and providing smaller and
more transparent anti-poverty programs, focused on the poorest.
Instead, on the economic policy front, notwithstanding over two decades of gradual but
persistent liberalization of the economy, the economy continues to be more protected than
countries in Latin America and East Asia, which started liberalization much after Sri Lanka. The
regulatory environment, particularly restrictions on labor and land markets, and less than fully
competitive financial markets, make the investment climate much less friendly in Sri Lanka than
in its competitors to the East. Hence, while reforms started in 1977 helped accelerate growth in
the 80s and 90s (from stagnation in the 60s and 70s), Sri Lanka has not been able to grow at the
double digit rates of its neighbors to the East. The ethnic conflict has obviously also been a
complicating factor, which has set back poverty reduction and growth by diverting a large share
of public resources to defense, discouraging tourism, and investment. Sri Lanka ended the
twentieth century with per capita income less than half that of Thailand, one-fourth that of
Malaysia, and one just one-tenth that of the Republic of Korea, countries at comparable stages of
development just a few decades ago.
Regarding the role of the state in the economy, notwithstanding significant advances in
privatization (plantations, telecommunications, national airline, a variety of industrial plants), the
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state continues to own a large share of the banking system, two large insurance companies,
power utilities, all water utilities, railways, food marketing companies, and all higher education
institutions, among others. This has both prevented the private sector from investing and
diverted public resources away from much needed investments in infrastructure, such as roads,
that the private sector cannot undertake. For example, now as 15 years ago, it takes nearly 4
hours of travel to cover just over 100 km to Kandy, the country's second city, and about the same
to cover nearly the same distance to the country's second largest port of Galle. Regions only
slightly more distant, such as Uva and the North Central Province, are even more isolated. As a
result, while the liberalization and associated growth brought benefits to the Western Province
with good infrastructure, it failed to spill over the rest of the country. Colombo and neighboring
areas experience a low incidence of poverty, but it is several times higher in the rest of the
country.
It is not only the poor that suffer from inadequate infrastructure. One of Sri Lanka's
surprising features, is that wealthier households too face significant shortfalls in the provision of.
such basic infrastructure. Indicators of per capita consumption of energy and number of phone
lines, for instance, are significantly lower in Sri Lanka than in countries with comparable per
capita income levels, such as Bolivia and China. These shortfalls affect the welfare of
households directly and also indirectly, by limiting economic growth in the poorer areas of Sri
Lanka and contributes to keeping the returns to education and health low. Poorer regions of Sri
Lanka and poorer households face the most severe shortfalls. The poor have less access to basic
services, such as clean drinking water, sanitation, electricity, safe cooking fuel, and
communications, than wealthier households. Provision of basic infrastructure, such as power,
water, and sanitation, is deficient especially outside Colombo, where most of the poor live.
In terms of social policies, Sri Lanka has a long tradition of protecting acquired rights,
and encouraging patronage-rather than stimulating market-based creation of opportunities. Job
banks, access to public sector employment, distribution of public lands, language policy, and anti
poverty programs, have all in their own different ways sought to bring benefits to targeted poor,
more often chosen on grounds other than objective need. As documented in academic work and
official reports, this has eroded trust in public institutions, and some see it as an important reason
for the eruptions of youth violence. The report of the 1991 Presidential Commnission on Youth,
which had been appointed to examine the causes of youth discontent and unrest that led to the
Marxist rebellion of 1987-89, reported that there was a strong consensus within the country that
politicization and abuse of power and injustice were the main causes of youth unrest. In
particular, the Commission felt that the politicization of employment, an extreme manifestation
of which is the "chit system", was deemed by youth as incompatible with the basic norms of
fairness, equity, and merit. The Samurdhi anti-poverty program is one more recent example.
Samurdhi, which costs about 1 percent of Sri Lanka's GDP and covers nearly half of all
households, suffers from design weaknesses that have resulted in the exclusion of nearly 40
percent of the poorest from the program, many of them members of ethnic minorities, and the
transfer of resources to many of the wealthy. There are also indications that like Janasaviya (the
program in place during the early 1 990s), Samurdhi may have also become politicized, with
support granted on the basis of political affiliation.
The slower pace and unbalanced composition of economic growth in Sri Lanka relative
to its East Asian neighbors have in tun translated into slower and geographically uneven
progress in reducing overall income poverty. According to the Government's 2000 Framework
for Poverty Reduction paper, between one fourth and one fifth of Sri Lankans lived below the
national poverty line in the mid 1990s, corresponding to nearly 7 percent living on less than
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US$1 a day, and over 45 percent on less than US$2 a day. Although it may have declined further
since then, the incidence of poverty is still about twice that in Malaysia, the Republic of Korea,
and Thailand, for largely comparable national poverty lines. Poverty is also higher in Sri Lanka
for intemationally comparable poverty lines. In addition, obstacles to socio-economic mobility
and integration, physical (such as poor roads and communications) and regulatory (such as the
rigid labor and land regulations) contribute not only to keep growth below potential, but also to
relatively high price and wage differentials, and ultimately to increasing regional disparities in
poverty. Within Sri Lanka, wherever growth has been stronger -- in manufacturing and service
activities, concentrated in the Western Province - poverty has declined rapidly and is now
relatively low. Where growth has stagnated or has been slow -- in agriculture, the main activity
in rural areas - poverty has declined slowly and remains high.
Who are the poor? Sri Lanka's achievements in providing universal and free education
and health care to the general population are reflected also in good social indicators of the poor.
The poor fare considerably better in some key non-income dimensions of poverty in Sri Lanka
than in most other developing countries. Over 90 percent of the poor in Sri Lanka have
completed at least primary education (although the education provided to the poor may be of
poor quality) and around half have at least secondary education. Other social policies appear to
have been successful. The incidence of poverty is identical among female and male headed
households. Less than 2 percent of the poor are unemployed, and although child labor remains a
problem, Sri Lanka has been more successful than other developing countries at curbing the
practice.
In other respects, the poor in Sri Lanka are like the poor in most other nations. Relative
to wealthier households, they own fewer assets and are engaged in activities (small-scale
agriculture) that earn these assets a lower rate of return. More than 90 percent of Sri Lanka's
poor live in the rural and estate (or plantation) sectors; for half of them, small-scale agriculture
and wage labor on farms and plantations provides the main sources of income. The poorest work
in paddy production or in plantations. There is poverty in urban areas, but poverty and isolation
is worst and most widespread in remote, rural areas, where the depth and the severity of poverty
are nearly twice that of urban areas. In Moneragala district, Uva Province, for example, nearly
half of all households live in absolute poverty. In the Western Province, where the capital city
and most manufacturing and services are located, the incidence of poverty is relatively low. In
the Colombo district, for instance, 1 in 10 households is poor.
The incidence of poverty varies little across the major ethnic groups (Sinhalese, Sri
Lankan Tamils, Indian Tamils, and Muslims or Moors) with the exception of Indian Tamils, most
of whom are poor. Indian Tamils are among the poorest people in Sri Lanka. Living largely on
tea, rubber, and other plantation estates, they also suffer the highest degree of social and
economic isolation. They are often deprived of basic infrastructure and receive the lowest
quantity and quality of other publicly provided services, such as education and health services.
Because of the civil conflict and the often remote location of estates, their mobility is also
restricted. Language barriers (many speak only Tamil) and, for some, lack of identity cards also
severely curtail their ability to integrate themselves into the economy and society. As a result,
while many benefited from the restructuring in the plantation sector, others were unable to
relocate.
In the northeast and areas bordering it, which are directly affected by the civil conflict,
the extent of material deprivation and human suffering are highest. Poverty estimates are
unavailable for the northeast, due to the impossibility of carrying out a representative household
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survey in a war area. Data from the 1999/2000 Sri Lanka Integrated Survey, which attempted to
cover the North East to the extent possible, reveal that household incomes would be amongst the
lowest in the country, were it not for remittances received from abroad. Foreign and domestic
remittances are an important source of income for households throughout Sri Lanka, but
remittances from abroad are the main safety net of households in the northeast.
Compared to other Sri Lankan households, households in the northeast and border
villages are the most disadvantaged in terms of their ability to obtain a secure livelihood.
Virttially every household in these areas experiences the impact of the war, either directly,
through loss of life, assets, or displacement, or indirectly, as a result of the deterioration of
infrastructure that has resulted from the conflict. Among the most severely affected groups are
households that have been displaced, sometimes repeatedly, as a result of conflict in or threats to
their home villages. Displaced families have lost productive assets (agricultural equipment,
livestock, shops, mills), including land they had cultivated. Most of the displaced remain in
refugee camps, often for years. Death, injury, and displacement statistics can only approximate
the extent of human suffering in the North East. According to SLIS data, individuals in the
North East are far more likely to suffer personal injury than households anywhere else in the
country, in particular in the Western Province. One out of every twelve households in the North
East reported that a family member was killed as a result of the civil conflict. Among the poorest
households, in the North East the rate is even higher with one out of every seven poor households
reporting a member killed. Several studies reveal very high levels of wasting and stunting among
children and very poor nutritional status among women, especially among the Tamil and in
"uncleared" (under LTTE control) areas.
Crafting a Strategy for Accelerating Poverty Reduction
Over the last three years, the Govemment of Sri Lanka has made an extraordirary effort
to deepen its understanding of the nature and root causes of poverty in Sri Lanka, including in the
areas directly affected by the conflict, with a view to reassessing and reformulating its policy
framework for reducing poverty. The Govemment's Framework for Poverty Reduction paper
presented to donors at the Development Forum in December 2000 already signals a welcome
shift in the govemment's poverty reduction paradigm. The paper, a product of recent analytical
work (part of which in collaboration with the World Bank and the UNDP) and of a broad
consultation process within Sri Lanka, indicates the need to rely more on economic opportunities
and growth than on redistribution to reduce poverty; to correct inefficiencies and inequities in the
social protection system, in particularly in the Samurdhi program; to empower the poor through
improved govemance; and to achieve a peaceful resolution to the civil conflict. More recently,
and on the basis of President Kumaratunga's Vision for the 21 't Century (August 1999) and the
Budget Policy Statement of 2001, the Govermment initiated preparation of a "Vision 2010" to be
discussed with civil society, donors and the private sector for determining the country's long-
term development goals and strategic priorities. In addition, an island-wide consultative process
was launched to collect the views of key stakeholders on how the Government, civil society, and
the donor community could work together on improving relief and rehabilitation in war-affected
areas, develop a code of operation, coordination and institution building, and promote
reconciliation and peace building.
The primary goals of the Government's strategy are to secure peace and to achieve
significant transformation in the quality of life of the people, especially in rural areas, through
increased incomes, economic modernization and invigoration of the rural economy. Tackling
poverty in Sri Lanka will not be achieved by adding a government program here or there.
Reducing poverty will require all policies, expenditures, and programs to be evaluated for their
impact ori the livelihoods of the average household and on the poorest Sri Lankans. Three broad
areas of action are crucial to reducing poverty and raising per capita incomes: creating a policy
environment'that is conducive to raising the incomes of the poor, providing effective public
services that reach the poor in the core areas of government responsibility, and finding a peaceful
resolution to the conflict.
Creating a Policy Environment that Facilitates Poverty Reduction
Households and individuals tend to escape poverty and reduce vulnerability to downward
shocks through their own initiative and efforts, which public policies can either encourage and
facilitate or discourage and hinder. A policy framework that helps accelerate growth, including in
agriculture; increases real wages and employment; facilitates the mobility of labor and other
factors to rapidly growing sectors; and limits inflation, will create an environment in which
poverty can be reduced. Prudent fiscal management, financial sector restructuring, outward-
oriented trade and investment policies, and a transparent climate for small, medium, and large-
scale investors, are all critical features of this environment.
Fiscal policy. High fiscal deficits put upward pressure on interest rates, thereby
restricting growth. Despite efforts to contain expenditures, increasing defense and interest
outlays caused the government to run budget high deficits throughout the 1990s. Defense
expenditures also crowd out development spending, namely'on much needed investment in, and
maintenance of infrastructure. Furthermore, for the public budget to benefit the poor, the
government needs to review the pattern of spending across and within sectors, look hard at what
tax concessions and subsidies can be eliminated, and design a pattern of expenditures that favors
the poor.
Deregulation and privatization. Accelerating growth also requires that the pace of
structural reform speed up. A considerable reform agenda of privatization, deregulation, and
removal of distortions in markets and prices has been highlighted by the President, and remains
unfinished. There has been some reduction in state control in recent years through the divestiture
of state-owned enterprises and fiscal retrenchment, but the state still intervenes in many
production and trading activities, crowding out more efficient private initiative. The business
environment is constrained by the inadequate public institutions, public policies, and the
regulatory framework is not in tune with the needs of the market economy. As a result, the
private sector has not realized its full potential, especially in rural areas.
Policies for agricultural growth. The sources of sustained growth and poverty reduction
will continue to be manufacturing and services and facilitating the growth of these sectors should
continue to be a priority. In the short and medium run, however, many of the poor will continue
to remain engaged in agriculture. The policy framework for agriculture, including the trade
regime for agricultural inputs, technology, and outputs, is currently a serious constraint to
reducing poverty. Increasing agricultural incomes and productivity requires improving access,
use, and tradability of land and reducing government involvement in agricultural marketing.
Land market reform is a key ingredient for high agricultural growth rates, as experience in
Indonesia and Thailand has shown. Past land policies in Sri Lanka, which aimed at equitably
distributing land among small-scale farmers, may have fostered smallholder subsistence
agriculture. The land market in Sri Lanka is constrained by the state's role as dominant landlord,
by restrictions on land sale and use in some areas, and by inadequate land registry. State control
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over land, along with ill-defined property rights and tight restrictions on the transferability and
use of land, restrict farmers' ability to obtain credit, move, or shift into higher-value crops.
Trade policy for agricultural outputs and inputs must be made more consistent and
transparent. Sri Lanka followed a relatively open international trade regime in the 1990s, but
trade policy on agricultural goods and foodstuffs is unpredictable, distorting production-decisions
and contributing to the volatility of farmer incomes. Import tariffs for agricultural produce are
often changed on an ad hoc basis, and interventions by the state-owned Cooperative Wholesale
Establishment have contributed to sharp variations in output prices in the past. Erratic trade
policy has led to large and unpredictable variations in the quantity of imports of major food
commodities and thus their farm gate prices. The import regime also discourages the private
sector from investing in.food commodity processing and storage, leaving the activity solely to the
government. A dynaamic private sector could perform all of these functions more effectively.
Labor marketflexibility. For growth to be effective in reducing poverty, the poor need
to be able to increase the returns on their assets and outputs. Policies that facilitate rather than
discourage mobility and reallocation in the markets for labor, capital, land, and natural resources
are key to increasing the incomes of the poor. Currently, excessive restrictions prevent labor,
capital, and land from being allocated to more productive uses. Labor laws, for example, restrict
the scope and range of labor contracts, and the state remains an active employer, paying above-
market wages, encouraging queuing. The state owns about 60 percent of all land and holds a
quasi-monopoly in education (about 95 percent of schools are government run). These distortions
constrain growth and contribute to the persistence of poverty.
To encourage private sector growth and job creation, labor regulations should be made
more flexible. Sri Lanka's Ternination of Employment and Workmen Act is among the most
restrictive in the world. Under this law, termination of employment is possible only with prior
written consent of the employee or the Commissioner of Labor. The process leading to the
consent of the Commissioner of Labor is nontransparent, with dispute resolution taking several
months and sometimes years, during which time firms must continue paying the salaries of
redundant workers. The government has attempted to ease these restrictions by creating Export
Processing Zones and providing special concessions through the Board of Investment, but such
measures provide relief only to large enterprises located near Colombo. For smaller enterprises
and those located away from the capital, inflexible labor laws continue to impose high costs,
discouraging employment creation in rural areas.
Providing Effective Core Public Services That Reach the Poor
Infrastructure for connectivity and integration. Regional disparities in the incidence of
poverty in Sri Lanka reflect, at least partly, the lack of a coherent strategy to integrate and
develop different regions of Sri Lanka. Improved provision roads, energy, water and sanitation,
and other types of infrastructure is needed to support the development of manufacturing and
services in rural areas. One of the most significant problems is the absence of a good road
network connecting major supply areas to demand centers, which limits not only non-farm
growth but also limits the ability of farmers to switch to higher value-added crops or expand
nonfarm activities.
Improved infrastructure is needed, but more investment in infrastructure alone is not the
answer. New infrastructure and maintenance programs must be designed to support welfare
through both income creation and improved living standards. Funds are wasted when programs
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fail to provide the services people need, infrastructure is unreliable because of poor materials or
workmnanship, or the intended beneficiaries are incapable of using or maintaining the goods and
services provided-all outcomes that have resulted from top-down approaches. Improved
governance, including a leaner, better organized, and more accountable public adniinistration; a
more effective budget process; and a stronger local administration, can help improve the level
and quality of basic services to the poor.
Quality public services: education. Improving the quality of other publicly provided
services, such as education and health, will help the poor acquire knowledge and skills valued by
the labor market. For the poor, quality of education may be low, as reflected in lower learning
outcomes for poorer regions of Sri Lanka. Class sizes in poor communities, most rural, are often
more than twice as large as in wealthier ones. Findings from the Sri Lanka Integrated Survey
also reveal a growing shortage of teachers in English, mathematics, and science. The lack of
teachers in these subjects, which are considered vital to employability, means that instruction is
either inadequate or unavailable in many rural areas. Schools in war-affected areas and border
areas, as well as villages with poor road access and transportation limitations, find it particularly
difficult to recruit qualified teachers. The deficient provision of education for the children of
poor households today will result in the persistence or increase in poverty and inequality
tomorrow.
Effective and affordable safety nets for the most vulnerable. For the majority of the
population, including many of the poor, government policy can be most effective by helping the
poor help themselves. Untargeted subsidies and large income support programs, such as
Samurdhi, are costly and unnecessary. In Sri Lanka, basic assistance and income support
through well targeted safety net programs would still be required for four groups of vulnerable
people. These are: (i) a small group of people likely to remain chronically poor (orphans, the
physically disabled, and elderly and widows without family and kinship ties) because they cannot
take advantage of existing opportunities; (ii) people "trapped" in pockets of poverty because they
face constraints to mobility and integration in the short run, such as estate, irrigation and
resettlement colony populations; (iii) people affected directly by the war, through death of
breadwinner, injury, displacement, and loss of assets; (iv) people affected by catastrophic risk,
such as floods or severe droughts, for whom the best public policy is the promotion of a
combination of risk prevention and coping support. A larger group of people who experience
intermittent periods of ill health or unemployment may require a temporary cushion that enables
and encourages them to return to productive activity.
An effective safety net should help prevent a very low standard of living by reducing and
mitigating downside socioeconomic risk or coping with its occurrences; it should not create
dependence or discourage individual effort. In its current form, the Samurdhi program fails to
meet this standard. Furthermore, economic theory as well as cross-country evidence from
developing countries indicate that transfer programs like Samurdhi cannot achieve sustained
reductions in poverty.
Inferring need through means testing alone, as the Samurdhi program tries to do, is
always difficult. In Sri Lanka, it has lead to leakages, thus becoming costly, and become subject
to capture by ethnic or political groups, thus undermining social cohesion. A more effective and
affordable set of safety net programs could use a combination of methods of identification,
including categorical and means testing criteria (for the chronically poor), geographical criteria
(for those in pockets of poverty or affected by catastrophic risk), and self-targeting (for all
groups). Revamping the safety net program in this way would serve the needs of the poor who
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cannot participate in the growth process and reduce their vulnerability to negative shocks. ~ ~
Geographical transfers to estate populations and others should not, however, replace efforts to-,. ,
remove the obstacles to social and economic integration suffered by these communities.
Public administrationm Improvements in the delivery of physical and social
infrastructure as well as social protection will require a more effective and accountable public
administration. Traditionally, public sector management in Sri Lanka was considered superior to
that in many other developing countries. There is a perception that the quality of governance has
declined, however. Sri Lanka's move to an open market economy, however hesitant, has not been
accompanied by similar transformations in public adm-inistration. The public sector is large,
costly, and suffers from low effectiveness and efficiency. With 12 p.ercent of its labor force
employed in govemrnment in 1999, Sri Lanka has the largest bureaucracy per capita in Asi a. This
bureaucracy is also expensive to maintain, as public sector workers with the lowest levels of
education earn almost twice as much as their counterparts in the nonpublic sector.
Sri Lanka has also failed to realize many of the potential benefits of decentralization.
The design of decentralized govemnment structures and the ways in whic-x implementation have
been executed in Sri Lanka have inhibited high-quality, demand-driven service delivery to all
segments of the population. Inadequate attention has been devoted to economic incentives
associated with the fiscal aspects of decentralization, and the central government has not
withdrawn from the devolved functions. As a result, Sri Lanka has developed a highly complex
framework of decentralization, which has created confusion and ambiguity regarding roles and
responsibilities of both elected and administrative anms of government. The result has been
reduced accountability and transparency, which constrain the growth and miaturation of
decentralized government institutions.
Achieving Peace and Social Harmony
Part of Sri Lanka's difficulty in raising incomes and reducing poverty can be traced to
the 17-year old ethnic conflict. Reducing poverty and human suffering in Sri Lanka, including
the Northeast, requires an end to the civil conflict, the consequences of which are felt in every
sphere of social and economic life. A study conducted by the Institute of Policy Studies estimates
the present value cost of the conflict during 1984-96 at nearly 170 percent of Sri Lanka's 1996
GDP. The 1999 annual report of the central bank of Sri Lanka estimates that the conflict has
reduced Sri Lanka's economic growth by about 2-3 percentage points a year. The conflict has
also contributed to a widespread feeling of despair and hopelessness among youth, an increase in
violence, and brain drain.
The costs of the war have fallen disproportionately on the poor. Faced with fewer
opportunities to earn a living, the rural poor serve in the armed forces on both sides.
Expenditures on the war effort, which have accounted for about 5 percent of GDP in recent
years, crowd out a vast range of pro-growth and pro-poor public expenditures. The instability
brought about by the war also reduces investment and job creation. And the protracted conflict
has fueled ethnic polarization and discrimination and desensitized communities to the effects of
violence. Households in the northeast and border villages are the most disadvantaged in terms of
their ability to obtain a secure livelihood. Virtually every household in these areas experiences
the impact of the war, either directly, through loss of life, assets, or displacement, or indirectly,
as a result of the deterioration of infrastructure that has resulted from the conflict. Among the
most severely affected groups are households that have been displaced, sometimes repeatedly, as
a result of conflict in or threats to their home villages. Displaced famiflies have lost productive
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assets (agricultural equipment, livestock, shops, mills), including land they had cultivated. Most
of the displaced remain in refugee camps, often for years.
Policies that build social harmony and economic integration could be an important
element of Sri Lanka's poverty strategy. Education and language policy, for instance, could help
reduce social divisions and improve the employment and educational prospects of the poor.
Education in Sri Lanka is currently provided in either Sinhala or Tamil, based on the ethnicity of
the parents. There is no requirement for Sinhalese to learn Tamil or Tamils to learn Sinhala.
English is used for instruction in only a few private schools, most located in Colombo. Mastery
of English, the language of the private sector, could be a powerful asset for the poor. English is
also the language in which many of the university degrees are in high demand, such as medicine
and engineering, are taught. Teaching children from poor households to speak English could help
them obtain better-paid jobs in the growing areas of the economy.

Chapter 1
The Evolution and Nature of Poverty in Sri Lanka
1.1 The case of Sri Lanka has often been cited as an example of a "support-led" strategy for
improving basic capabilities (Sen 1981; Dreze and Sen 1989; Isenman, 1980, 1987). This
approach is based on the belief that economic growth occurs too slowly to provide substantial
benefits to the poor within a reasonable period of time and that the government must therefore
act to ensure a minimum standard of living. In Sri Lanka, a large share of public expenditures,
between around 7-10 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), has been redistributed to
households over the years in the form of free education and health services, as well as food
subsidies, food stamps, and subsidized credit to improve living standards and ensure minimum
consumption levels of households perceived to be in need.
1.2 Sri Lanka has led developing nations in recognizing the importance of health and
education for development. As a result, it now boasts social indicators more in line with those of
a developed nation than those of a country in which per capita income is just over US$800.
Successive governments have maintained the country's emphasis on universal health and
education and built on the high level of human capital inherited at independence. Universal and
free health and education services, and focus on gender equality and the education of women
have been permanent features of Sri Lanka's social policies over several decades. Many of these
programs have benefited from strong external donor support and/or Non Governmental
Organization (NGO) involvement. These remarkable achievements have meant higher levels of
well-being for all Sri Lankans, and have considerably reduced non income poverty.
1.3 Sri Lanka's success in reducing income poverty is less noteworthy, especially when
contrasted with that of East Asian countries that were at comparable levels of development only
a few decades ago (Table 1.1 and Figure 1.1). In the 1960s, Sri Lanka's income per capita was
comparable to that of Malaysia, the Republic of Korea, and Thailand, and prospects for balanced
growth and development were brighter. By the end of the twentieth century, income in Sri Lanka
was less than half that of Thailand, one-fourth that of Malaysia, and just one-tenth that of the
Republic of Korea. Although consumption poverty in Sri Lanka declined to about 25 percent
(excluding the war-affected North East) in 1995/96 and may have fallen further since then, this is
still about twice that in Malaysia, the Republic of Korea, and Thailand, for largely comparable
national poverty lines. Poverty is also higher in Sri Lanka than in Thailand and Korea for
internationally comparable poverty lines.1 Poverty might have declined since the mid-nineties, in
particular because 1996 was a drought year, yet this remains an unacceptably high level of
poverty for most Sri Lankans. Furthermore, poverty indicators are likely to underestimate
poverty in the country. Because of the conflict, suitable household surveys could not have been
launched in the war-affected areas of the northeast since the mid-1980s. However, it is
incontestable that poverty and certainly human suffering have increased in this region with the
escalation of the war. Other--more difficult to measure--forms of poverty, such as personal
insecurity and vulnerability also appear to be on the rise throughout the country, partly as
spillovers of the conflict.
Lack of comnparable data makes it imnpossible to contrast the pace of poverty reduction.
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Table 1.1: Incidence of Poverty and per Capita GNP in Sri Lanka and East Asian Comparator
Countries
Poverty incidence Income
(% of population living below poverty line) (US$)
Intemational poverty lines a National poverty line
Population below Population below $2 Per capita GNP
$1 a day a day
Country 1990s 1960s 1999
Indonesia 15 66 20 55b 580
Rep. of Korea less than 2 less than 2 - 94 8,490
Malaysia 
- - 15 338 3,400
Sri Lanka 7 45 25 151 820
Thailand less than 2 28 13 149 1,960
- Not available.
Notes: Poverty incidence estimates exdude the North and East Poverty estmates are based on a local (reference) consumption poverty threshold
of 2,500 calores and 53 grams of protein per day and male adult (20-39 years) equivalent costing 792 rupees per person a month at 1995-96
prices.
a. Latest estimates, 1990s.
b. 1967 figure.
Source: Word Bank, 2000a, Datt and Gunewardena 1997,1995/96: Gunewardena 2000.
Figure 1.1: Per Capita Gross National Product (GNP), Atlas Method
Sri Lanka and East Asian Comparator Countries
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1.4 An explanation for Sri Lanka's relatively slower progress in reducing poverty and
increasing average incomes is the country's hesitant embrace of modern economic and social
policies. Such policies would have lead to: (a) withdrawal of the state from all areas where the
private sector can be more efficient and removal of regulations hindering the effective
functioning of markets, with a view to evolving a policy framework that supports creation of
opportunities; (b) focusing the state on the provision of much needed infrastructure and social
services that the private sector cannot provide; (c) social policies accommodating diversity -
ethnic, linguistic, political, religious - and understanding among different groups, providing fair
and transparent access to resources and opportunities, and providing smaller and more
transparent anti-poverty programs, focused on the poorest.
-3 -
1.5 Instead, on the economic policy front, notwithstanding over two decades of gradual but
persistent liberalization of the economy, the economy continues to be more protected than
countries in Latin America and East Asia, which started liberalization much after Sri Lanka. The
regulatory environment, particularly restrictions on labor and land markets, and less than fully
competitive financial markets, make the investment climate much less friendly in Sri Lanka than
in its competitors to the East. Hence, while the reforns started in 1977 helped accelerate growth
in the 80s and 90s (from stagnation in the 60s and 70s), Sri Lanka has not been able to grow at
the double digit rates of its neighbors to the East. The ethnic conflict has obviously been a
complicated factor that diverted large share of public resources to defense, and discouraged
tourism, and investment.
1.6 Regarding the role of the state in the economy, notwithstanding remarkable advances
in privatization (plantations, telecommunications, national airline, a variety of industrial plants),
the state continues to own a large share of the banking system, two large insurance companies,
power utilities, all water utilities, railways, food marketing companies, and all higher education
institutions, among others. This has both prevented the private sector from investing and
diverted public resources from much needed investments in infrastructure, such as roads, that the
private sector cannot undertake. For example, now as 15 years ago, it takes around 5 hours of
travel to cover just over 100 km to Kandy, the country's second city, and around 6 hours to cover
nearly the same distance to the country's second largest port of Galle. Slightly more distant
areas, such as Uva and the North Central Province are considerably more isolated. As a result,
while the liberalization and associated growth brought benefits to the Western Province with
good infrastructure, it failed to spill over the rest of the country. Colombo and neighboring areas
experience a low incidence of poverty, but it is several times higher in the rest of the country.
1.7 It is not only the poor that suffer from inadequate infrastructure. One of Sri Lanka's
surprising features, is that wealthier households too face significant shortfalls in the provision of
such basic infrastructure. Indicators of per capita consumption of energy and number of phone
lines, for instance, are significantly lower in Sri Lanka than even in countries with comparable
per capita income levels, such as Bolivia and China (Table 1.2). These shortfalls affect the
welfare of households directly and also indirectly, by limiting economic growth in the poorer
areas of Sri Lanka and contributes to keeping the returns to education and health low. Poorer
regions of Sri Lanka and poorer households face the most severe shortfalls. The poor have less
access to basic services, such as clean drinking water, sanitation, electricity, safe cooking fuel,
and communications, than wealthier households. Provision of basic infrastructure, such as power,
water, and sanitation, is deficient especially outside Colombo and in plantations, where most of
the poor live.
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Table 1.2. Per capita Energy Consumption and Communications, Sri Lanka and comparator
countries
Per capita GNP (1999) Per capHta Energy Telephones (1997)
Atlas Method Measured at PPP Consumption (1998) Main lines Mobiles
(US$) (Kilowatt-hours) (n. per 1,000 people)
Albania 870 2892 851 31 1
Bolivia 1010 2193 391 69 27
China 780 3291 714 70 19
Indonesia 580 2439 329 27 5
Sri Lanka 820 3056 227 28 9
Notes: PPP - Purchasing Power Parity; because nominal exchange rates do not always reflect intematonal differences in relatve prices, GNP can
be converted to intema6onal dollars by the PPP exchange rate. At the PPP rate, one intematonal dollar has the same purchasing power over
domestc GNP that the US dollar has over US GNP.
Source: World Bank, 2000a.
1.8 In terms of social policies, Sri Lanka has a long tradition of protecting acquired rights,
and encouraging patronage-rather than stimulating market based creation of opportunities. Job
banks, access to public sector employment, distribution of public lands, language policy, and anti
poverty programs, have all in their own different ways sought to bring benefits to targeted poor,
more often chosen on grounds other than objective need. As documented in academic work and
official reports, this has eroded trust in public institutions, and some see it as'an important reason
for the eruptions of youth violence. The report of the 1991 Presidential Commission on Youth,
which had been appointed to examine the causes of youth discontent and unrest that led to the
Marxist rebellion of 1987-89, reported the there was a strong consensus within the country that
politicization and abuse of power and injustice were the main causes of youth unrest. In
particular, the Commission felt that the politicization of employment, an extreme manifestation
of which is the "chit system" (the practice of receiving a letter from one's Member of Parliament
in order to find public sector employment), was deemed by youth as incompatible with the basic
norms of fairness, equity, and merit. The Samurdhi Program, analyzed in Part II of this report, is
one recent example. Samurdhi, which costs about 1 percent of GDP, suffers from design
weaknesses, which have resulted in the exclusion of nearly 40 percent of the poor, many of them
members of ethnic minorities, and the transfer of resources to many of the wealthy. There are
also indications that like Janasaviya (the anti-poverty program in place during the early 1990s),
Samurdhi may have also become politicized, with support granted on the basis of political
affiliation.
1.9 The slower pace and unbalanced composition of economic growth in Sri Lanka have in
turn translated into slower and geographically uneven progress in reducing overall income
poverty. In addition, obstacles to socio-economic mobility and integration, physical (such as
poor roads and communications) and regulatory (such as the rigid labor and land regulations)
contribute not only to keep growth below potential, but also to relatively high price and wage
differentials, and ultimately to increasing regional disparities in poverty. Within Sri Lanka,
wherever growth has been stronger -- in manufacturing and service activities, concentrated in the
Western Province - poverty has declined rapidly and is poverty lower. Where growth has
stagnated or has been slow -- in agriculture, the main activity in rural areas - poverty has
declined slowly and remains high.
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Poverty Trends in Sri Lanka: Slow Poverty Reduction and Increasing Regional Divergences
1.10 Overall, poverty in Sri Lanka has declined since independence. Both the 1995 Poverty
Assessment and other studies revealed a significant decline in the incidence of poverty in Sri
Lanka between 1953 and 1985.2 Analysis of the three most recent household data sets indicates
that the declining trend in poverty has continued since the mid-1980s but that poverty reduction
slowed during the early 1990s (Box 1.1 and Figure 1.2). This trend is apparent regardless of the
income level at which the poverty threshold is set (see Annex A, Figure Al).3 A similar pattern
occurs in inequality.
Figure 1.2: Incidence of Poverty and Consumption Inequality
in Sri Lanka, 1985186-1995196
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Note: Poverty incidence estimates are based on DCS datasets that exclude the North and East.
Estimates are based on a local (reference) consumption poverty threshold of 2,500 calories and
53 grams of protein per day and male adult (20-39 years) equivalent, costing 792 rupees per person a
month at 1995-96 prices.
Source: 1985/86-1990/91: Datt and Gunewardena 1997; 1995/96: Gunewardena 2000.
1.11 The increase in the incidence of poverty in rural areas between 1990/91 and 1995/96 is
likely to at least partly reflect the impact of the 1996 drought, suggesting a high degree of
household vulnerability to shocks.4 The years 1990 and 1996, during which household surveys
2Because of data comparability problems, the analysis compared data on private per capita consumption
with data on the distribution of household income.
3A decomposition of changes in the Foster, Greer, and Thorbecke (FGT) (1984) measures of poverty
according to the methodology set out in Datt and Ravallion (1992) reveals that between 1985/86 and
1990/91 national poverty fell because of consumption growth and favorable redistribution. Between
1990/91 and 1995/96, the lack of consumption growth explains the rise in poverty. The pattem of
redistribution was more complex: favorable redistribution offset the lack of consumption growth in the
urban sector. In the rural and estate sectors, both growth and redistribution effects were adverse,
contributing to the significant rise in poverty (Gunewardena 2000).
4The incidence of poverty in any one year is best characterized as a random variable that can follow a trend
but is susceptible to random fluctuations. These fluctuations are deviations from the mean that would
occur in a large set of repeated drawings conditional on government policies and exogenously determined
variables in a given year.
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were conducted by the Department of Census and Statistics, were exceptional years. In 1990 the
recovery in agriculture allowed the economy to grow 6 percent, up from 1 percent in 1988-89. In
1996 the economy was hit by several shocks, including a prolonged drought, the bombing of the
central bank, aind the escalation of the conflict, which negatively affected business confidence,
tourism, and foreign investment. Economic growth in 1996 was just 3.8 percent, with agriculture
falling 5 percent and paddy production declining 27 percent. The economy rebounded to grow
6.4 percent in 1997.
Box 1.1: Measuring Income Poverty in Sri Lanka: Methodology and data sources.
The Bank's firsl Poverty Assessment for Sn Lanka was completea in 1995 It focused on poverty outcomes up to 1990 and based its
poverty estimates on tne analysis of household data o)llectea during the first three rounds of the 1990/91 survey and Ihe corresponding
months of the 1985/86 survey This report analyzes the lull 1985/86 1990/91 data sets as well as the latest (1995/96) dala from vwhich
comparable poverty lines can be estimated. it uses the concept of consumption poverty (per capita consumpbon expendilure,
excluding expenditure on durables) as the main indicator ot standard of living To allow for a companson between eaoier findings and
those emerging from more recent data, this report follows the same approacn (See Deaton (1995) for a discussion of the relative merits
of using per capita consumpton as the individual welfare indicator for developing counines See Ravallion (19981 for a discussion of
how the concept of capabililies (Sen. 1985. 1987) can be related lo the nore convenlonal approaches lo wellare measuremernt found in
economics)
Poverty lines. Intemationally comparable poveny lines are useful for producing cormparable aggregates of poverty. They test for the
ability to purchase a basket of commodilies thal is similar across the world These lines are less suitable for the analysis of poverry
within a country. The national poverty line for Sn Lanka used in this report is based on a reference food poverty line of Rs 200 in
1985/86, denved from Nanayakkara and Premaratne (1987), whose food poverty line is Rs 203 at 1985/86 prices, corresponding lo a
normative threshold of 2500 calories and 53 grams of protein per adult (age 20-39) male equivalent This poverty line was updated
using a temporal food price index denved from unit values and expenditure weights from the 1985/86 LFSS Regional food poverty
fines were denved for ten regional areas, using spatial food pnces for 1995196 For furher details, see Gunewardena (2000).
Poverty measures. A poverty profile typically answers the question 'f an individual exhibits a particu!ar characteristic (e.g lives in a
particular region) *hat is Ihe likelihood of this individual being poor" In other words, what proportion of individuals with agiven
I characteristic are poor? This measure is known as the headcount index or incidence of poverty. which is part of a larger family of
measures known as Ihe FGT (Foster. Greer. Thorbecke, 1984) measures of consumption poverty on which this report relies to quantify
poverty in Sn Lanka. The FGT definitions of poverty measures used in this report include
* Headcount index. H, (the incidence of poverty) measures the percentage of individuals in a given populauon whose standard of
living lies below the poverty line
* Poverty Gal index. PG. (the depth of poverty) measures the average shotfall between an individual s level of consumption and
the poverty line, where the shortfall for all the individuals whose consumption is above the poverty line is zero.
* Souared Poverty Gap index, PG2, (the seventy of poveny) measures the squared shortfall-between an individual's level of
consumption and Ihe poverty line. ihereby placing a greater weighl on poorer individuals
Data sources. The analysis of trends in poverty levels is based on three broadly comparable data sources: the 1985/86 Labor Force
and Socio-economic Survey (LFSS), and the 1990/91 and 1995/96 Household Income and Expenditure Survey (HIES). all camed out
by Sri Lanka's Department of Census and Statislics (DCS) An additional household survey. the 1997,97 Consumer Finance Survey
collected by the Central Bank, has become available for public use only recently. The poverty nMfiLe is based on both the 1995/96 HIES
and three quarters of Sn Lanka Integraled Survey (SLIS) data for 1999/2000. The SLIS, with a multistage stratified random sample.
was designed as part of the joint Govemment of Sn Lanka-vvond Bank-UNDP work towards the aevelopment of a new poverty strategy
for Sri Lanka. This report is based on three quarters of the sample (approximately 6,600 households) collected between October 1999
and July 2000 across all provinces of the country Three features of the SLIS are noteworthy First, because it includes a detailea
module on various public services and poverty programs it is possible lo analyze the effectiveness of these public services in reaching
the poor Second, because it has national coverage (including households in the North-East), it is possible to identify and analyze the
disunguishing features of poverty and welfare in war-affected areas Third, because it includes a qualitalive assessment of poverry
complementary to the quanfitative data set, the SLIS can be used to include the perspectives of the poor themselves It is expected
that future household surveys will Integrate these useful features Because Ihe SLIS survey quesiionnaire is less detailed regarding the
food consumption basket than is required for the calculation of a poverty line, the profile is based instead on the characteristics of
households in the lowest expenditure quintile, i.e Ihe poorest 20 percent of households.
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1.12 Sri Lanka compares favorably with other South Asian countries in terms of poverty and
average incomes. (Figures 1.3 and 1.4). It also compares favorably in terms of nonincome
dimensions of poverty, such as education and health, and the prevalence of child labor (Figure
1.5).
Flgure 1.3: Incidence of Poverty In South Asia
(latest estimates with national poverty lines)
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Figure 1.4 Per Capita Income (GNP) at Purchasing, Power Parity (PPP), 1999
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Figure1.5: Workforce Participation Rates of Children in South Asian Countries
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1.13 Regional Disparities. Poverty indicators reveals a complex and changing landscape
within Sri Lanka. Poverty has declined rapidly and to low levels in the Western Province (Figure
6). Poverty studies based on earlier data (World Bank 1995; Datt and Gunewardena 1997)
indicated limited regional variation in poverty. Analysis of the 1995/96 Household Income and
Expenditure Survey and the 1999/2000 Sri Lanka Integrated Survey data indicates large and
growing disparities in the incidence, depth, and severity of poverty across regions (Figure 1.6 and
Tables 1.3 and 1.4). .
Figure 1.6: Trends in the Incidence of Poverty in Sri Lanka, by Province, 1985186-1995196
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Note: Poverty incidence esffmates are based on DCS datasets that exclude the North and East.
Source: 1990/91: Datt and Gunewardena 1997; 1995/96: Gunewardena 2000, based on Department of Census and Statisfics (DCS) data.
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Table 1.3: Contribution to Poverty by Province, (reference and higher poverty lines) 1985-96
(percent)
Poverty line Rs792 per person per Poverty line Rs. 950 per person per
month month
Province/measure of poverty 1985/86 1990/91 1995/96 1985186 1990/91 1995/96
Westem
Headcount 19 23 17 21 24 19
Povertygap 19 24 16 19 24 17
Squared poverty gap 18 24 14 19 24 16
Central
Headcount 15 18 17 16 17 17
Poverty gap 14 19 18 14 18 17
Squared poverty gap 13 20 19 14 19 18
Southem
Headcount 19 18 16 18 18 16
Poverty gap 21 19 16 20 18 16
Squared poverty gap 23 19 16 22 18 16
North Westem
Headcount 15 13 18 15 13 18
Povertygap 14 11 17 14 12 17
Squaredpovertygap 13 10 16 14 11 17
North Central
Headcount 7 6 8 8 7 7
Poverty gap 7 5 7 7 6 8
Squared poverty gap 6 4 7 7 5 7
Uva
Headcount 9 9 11 9 9 10
Poverty gap 11 9 13 10 9 11
Squared poverty gap 12 8 15 11 8 13
Sabaragamuwa
Headcount 15 13 14 14 12 14
Poverty gap 15 14 14 15 13 14
Squared povertygap 15 15 14 15 14 14
Note: Povert incIdence estmates are based on DCS datasets that exclude the North and East
Source: Gunewardena 2000.
Table 1.4: Poverty Reduction Rates, by Province (percent)
1985/86 to 1995196
1985-1990 1990-1995 1985-1995
Western 22 11 30.3
Central 22 -19 7.3
Southern 40 -12 32.4
North-Western 47 -88 -0.3
North-Central 45 -71 5.7
Uva 41 -56 8.6
Sabaragamuwa 44 -37 22.9
Note: positve rate Implies a dedine in poverty over the perod.
Source: Wodd Bank calculations based on Gunewardena 2000.
1.14 There are sharp regional disparities in economic welfare and living standards across Sri
Lanka (Figures 1.7 and 1.8, Table 1.5, Annex A, Table A2, and Annex A, Figure A4). In the
Western Province, where the capital city, 75 percent of manufacturing, and most services are
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located, the incidence of poverty is relatively low. In the Colombo district, for example, just 10
percent of households are poor. In the northeast and the areas bordering it, which are directly
affected by the civil conflict, the extent of material deprivation and human suffering is highest. In
the rest of Sri Lanka, most of which is rural and coastal, small-scale or plantation agriculture and
fisheries remain the main economic activities, and poverty and isolation are high. In the
Moneragala district, Uva province, for example, nearly half of all households live in absolute
poverty.
Figures 1.7 and Figure 1.8: Poverty Maps
Incidence of Poverty and Contribution to total poverty, by Province, 1995-96 (percentage)
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Table 1.5: Poverty by Province, 1995196
Province Inddence of Poverty Depth of Poverty Severity of Poverty
. Index Contribution Index Contributon Index Contributon
Poverty line=792 rupees per person per month
Westem 14 17 3 17 1 14
Central 28 17 6 18 2 19
Southemr 27 16 6 16 2 16
N.Westem 34 18 7 17 2 16
North Central 31 8 6 7 2 7
Uva 37 11 10 13 4 15
Sabaragamuwa 32 14 7 14 2 14
Note: Poverty inddence estimates are based on DCS datasets that exdude the North and East
Source: Gunewardena 2000.
1.15 Poverty is lower and has unambiguously declined in the urban sector, where the most
dynamic activities - manufacturing and services - are concentrated (Figures 1.9a, 1.9b, 1.9c).5
With the opening of the economy and better infrastructure in Colombo, manufacturing and
services have expanded rapidly, at over 6 percent a year on average. 90 percent of Sri Lanka's
poor, however, live in rural and estate areas and in those poverty remains high (Figures 1.1 Oa.
and 1.1 Ob). Individuals in households whose principal income earner was in agriculture
experienced a 46 percent fall in the incidence of poverty in the 1985-90 period, but a 62 percent
increase between 1990 and 1996. In 1995/96 they comprised 43 percent of the poor.
Figures 1.9a, 1.9b, 1.9c: Trends in the Incidence of Poverty, by Sector, 1985/86 to 1995/96
Urban Sector Rural Sector Estate Sector
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25 25 25
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Figures 1.10a. and 1.10b. Sector Contribution to Overall Poverty, 1985/86 and 1995196
Estate Urban Estate Urban
5% 12% 4% 8%
Rural Rural
83% 88%
Note: Poverty incidence estmates are based on DCS datasets that exdude the North and East
Sources' Graph data from: Daft and Gunewardena, 1997 for 1990/91; Gunewardena, 2000 for 1995/96, based on DCS data.
1.16 More than 90 percent of all poor people in Sri Lanka live in rural or estate areas,
however, where poverty remains high. Estate households, although accounting for only 4 percent
of all poor households, are among the poorest in Sri Lanka. The civil conflict and the often
5There are no reliable regionally-disaggregated valued added statistics for Sri Lanka. A series for the
period 1990-95 was produced for the 1998 UNDP Human Development Report for Sri Lanka and
indicated high regional and inter-year variability in growth rates. However these statistics are not
produced on a regular basis. Sector-wise and some regional disaggregation for manufacturing and
agriculture are available and were used in this report. It is important that regional value added estimates
be produced and disseminated in the future.
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remote location of estates restrict the geographic mobility of estate workers. Language barriers
(most estate workers speak only Tamil), discrimination, and, for some, lack of citizenship cards
further curtail their ability to integrate themselves into the Sri Lankan economy and society by
finding jobs outside the estate sector.6 These households also receive the poorest quantity and
quality of publicly provided services.
1.17 More than 40 percent of principal income earners in poor households are employed in
agriculture, and the poorest households rely on agriculture for more than half of their incomne
(earned either as small-scale farmers or wage laborers) (Table 1.6). Households in which the
principal income earner worked in agriculture experienced a 46 percent decline in the incidence
of poverty in the 1985-90 period but a 62 percent increase between 1990 and 1996. The
performance of the agricultural sector thus has a strong impact on poverty. Agriculture has
expanded slowly in Sri Lanka, and performance has been volatile (Figures 1.11 and 1.12).
Official statistics on agricultural value-added show an annual average growth rate of about 2
percent between 1990 and 1999 and just 1 percent during 1990-98. High levels of profitability
were restored in the plantation/estate sector following privatization, but social and geographical
constraints to the mobility of estate populations-which have reportedly tightened since the mid-
1980s, with the intensification of the conflict-prevented surplus labor-from moving into other
activities. In nonplantation agriculture, low-technology, inflexible land markets, and distorted
and unstable output prices have continued to keep returns to traditional agricultural crops low,
contributing to the persistence of poverty in rural areas.7
Figures 1.11 and Figure 1.12: Growth in Agriculture, Manufacturing and Services, 1985-96
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Source: World Bank 2000b
6 The closed nature of the labor market in the estate sector is discussed in Korale (1988). Korale also
describes government programs aimed at transferring people from densely populated wet zones to more
sparsely populated dry regions through agricultural development schemes, colonization, and village
expansion schemes.
7 Agricultural productivity, defined as agricultural value-added per agricultural worker, is low and has
increased little over the past decade in Sri Lanka (see Annex A, Figures A2 and A3).
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Table 1.6: Contribution to Poverty by Occupation of Household Head,
1985/86 to 1995/96 (percent)
Poverty line = Rs. 792 perperson Poverty line = Rs.950 per person
per month permonth
Occupation of household 1985/86 1990/91 1995/96 1985/86 1990/91 1995/96
head
Agriculture
Headcount 46 38 41 45 39 40
Poverty gap 46 35 41 45 37 41
Squared poverty gap 46 33 41 46 35 41
Mining and quarrying
Headcount 1 1 2 1 1 2
Poverty gap 1 1 2 1 1 2
Squared poverty gap 1 1 2 1 1 2
Manufacturing
Headcount 7 6 6 8 7 7
Poverty gap 7 7 6 7 7 6
Squared poverty gap 6 7 5 7 7 6
Construction
Headcount 5 4 5 5 4 5
Poverty gap 4 4 4 5 4 5
Squared poverty gap 4 3 4 4 4 4
Wholesale and retail trade
Headcount 5 7 6 5 7 7
Poverty gap 4 7 6 4 7 6
Squared poverty gap 3 7 6 4 7 6
Transportation
Headcount 2 2 2 2 3 2
Poverty gap 2 2 2 2 2 2
Squared poverty gap 1 2 2 2 2 2
Finance
Headcount 0 0 0 0 0 0
Poverty gap 0 0 0 0 0 0
Squared poverty gap 0 0 0 0 0 0
Communications
Headcount 4 8 6 5 7 6
Poverty gap 4 8 6 4 8 6
Squared poverty gap 3 8 6 4 8 6
Unclassified
Headcount 8 10 10 7 9 9
Povertygap 9 11 11 8 10 10
Squaredpovertygap 10 11 11 9 11 10
Unemployed/labor force nonparticipants
Headcount 23 24 21 23 23 22
Poverty gap 24 25 22 23 24 22
Squared poverty gap 25 27 23 24 25 22
Note: Poverty incidence eslirnates are based on DCS datasets that exdude the North and East
Source: Gunewardena 2000.
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1.18 Most of the poor live in provinces that are generally poor, namely, the North Westem,
North Central, Uva, and Sabaragamuwa provinces, where they earn a living from agriculture and
wage labor, often on a day basis. Average incomes and wages in rural and estate areas are much
lower than in Colombo. 1999/2000 data from the Sri Lanka Integrated Survey confirms that
economic welfare, measured in terms of per capita consumption expenditure, varies sharply
across consumption quintiles and provinces (see Annex A, Table A5). The poor, defined as those
with per capita expenditure falling in the lowest quintile of the distribution, consumed less than
half the average for the country and only two-thirds the level enjoyed by the next highest
quintile. Overall income inequality in Sri Lanka is relatively low (Table 1.7).
Table 1.7: Gini Coefficient of Consumption Inequality, all Provinces,
1995196 and 1999/2000
Gini coefficient of consumption inequality
Province 1995/96 1999/2000
Western .339 .358
Central .297 .349
Southem .294 .325
North Westem .268 .292
North Central .284 .264
Uva .287 .297
Sabaragamuwa .280 .331
North East - .235
Sri Lanka .326 .35
Notes: Gini coefficients not stuicty comparable due to differences in the definition of expenditures in the
1995/96 and 1999/2000 surveys.
-Not available
Sources: 1995/96:Gunewardena 2000, based on 1995/96 Household Income and Expenditure Survey;
1999/2000: World Bank, based on 1999/2000 Sn Lanka Integrated Survey.
1.19 Ethnicity. With the exception of Indian Tamils (often referred to as estate Tamils), the
majority of whom are poor, the incidence of poverty varies little across ethnic groups. Although
aggregate consumption inequality in Sri Lanka is not high (Gini coefficient of .32), inequality
across provinces and particularly across ethnic groups is low (Tables 1.8 and 1.9). Aggregate
consumption is lowest among Tamils living on estates, where inequality is low, indicating that
the majority of households are homogeneously poor.
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Table 1.8. Contribution to Poverty by Ethnicity of Household Head,
1985186 to 1995196 (percent)
Poverty line = Rs. 792 per person Poverty line = Rs. 950 per person
per month per month
Ethnicity of household 1985/86 1990/91 1995/96 1985/86 1990/91. 1995/96
head
Sinhalese
Headcount 87 84 84 86 83 84
Poverty gap 89 83 83 88 83 84
Squared poverty gap 89 82 83 88 83 83
Lankan Tamil
Headcount 4 5 5 4 5 5
Poverty gap 3 6 6 3 5 5
Squared poverty gap 3 7 6 3 6 6
Indian Tamil
Headcount 3 2 4 3 3 5
Poverty gap 2 2 3 3 2 4
Squared poverty gap 2 1 2 2 2 3
Lankan Moors
Headcount 6 8 7 6 8 6
Poverty gap 6 8 8 6 8 7
Squared poverty gap 6 9 8 6 8 8
Note: Poverty inddence estimates are based on DCS datasets that exdude the North and East.
Soufce: Gunewardena (2000).
Table 1.9: Gini Coefficient of Consumption Inequality in Sri Lanka, by Ethnicity,
1995/96 and 1999/2000
Ethnic group 1995/96 1999/2000
Sinhalese .327 .325
Lankan Tamil .344 .265
Indian Tamil .219 .249
Moor .312 .291
Source: 1995/96:Gunewardena 2000, based on 1995/96 Household Income and
Expenditure Survey; 1999/2000: World Bank, based on 1999/2000 Sri Lanka Integrated Survey.
1.20 Gender and Unemployment. Individuals in households headed by women are about as
likely to be poor as those living in households headed by men, regardless of the level at which
the poverty line is set (Table 1.1O).
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Table 1.10: Poverty by Gender of Household Head, 1985/86 to 1995/96
(percent)
Poverty line = Rs792 per person Poverty line = Rs.950 per person
per month per month
Gender 1985/86 1990/91 1995/96 1985186 1990/91 1995196
Male
Headcount 31 20 26 44 33 39
Poverty gap 7 4 5 12 8 10
Squared poverty gap 3 1 2 5 3 4
Female
Headcount 32 21 24 45 33 38
Povertygap 8 5 5 13 8 10
Squared poverty gap 3 1 2 5 3 3
Note: Poverty incidence estmates are based on DCS datasets that exclude the North and East.
Souse: Gunewardena 2000.
1.21 Unemployment does not contribute significantly to poverty in Sri Lanka. As previous
research has indicated, few of the poor are unemployed, with households whose head was
unemployed making up just 2 percent of poor households in 1995/96 (Table 1. 11). Results from
the Sri Lanka Integrated Survey indicate similar figures for households in the lowest expenditure
quintile.
Table 1.11: Contribution to Poverty by Employment of Principal Income Earner, 1985186 to 1995/96(percent)
Poverty line = Rs. 792 per person Poverty line = Rs. 950 per person
per month per month
Employment status 1985/86 1990/91 1995/96 1985/86 1990/91 1995/96
Employed
Headcount 91 92 95 91 93 95
Poverty gap 91 91 95 91 92 95
Squared poverty gap 90 91 94 90 92 95
Unemployed
Headcount 2 1 1 2 1 1
Poverty gap 2 1 1 2 1 1
Squared poverty gap 2 1 1 2 1 1
Labor fbrce nonparticipants
Headcount 7 7 5 7 6 5
Poverty gap 7 8 5 7 7 5
Squared poverty gap 8 9 5 8 8 5
Note: Povert incidence estmates are based on DCS datasets that exdude the North and East
Source: Gunewardena 2000.
1.22 Lack of Access to Infrastructure. The poor, especially those living in rural areas and
estates, have significantly less access to clean drinking water, sanitation, electricity, safe cooking
fuel, and communications than wealthier households. Only a fraction of poor families in
1999/2000 had access to safe cooking fuel (2 percent), electricity (38 percent), safe sanitation (55
percent) and clean drinling water (61 percent) (Table 1.12). Particularly striking is the fact that
only an estimated 60 percent of the SLIS sample had access to electricity. Limited access to these
resources reduces their living standards both directly and indirectly, by limiting economic growth
in poor regions.
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Table 1.12: Average Consumption and Access to Basic Infrastructure Services by Consumption
Quintile, Sector, and Ethnicity, 199912000
(percent, except where otherwise indicated)
Monthly average Access to
consumption per
capita Safe Latrine Safe Safe cooking Electricity
(SL Rupees) drinking sanitation fuel
Item water
Consumption quintile
Poorest 821 61 84 55 2 38
Second 1,211 74 85 67 5 49
Third 1,537 78 89 75 8 60
Fourth 1,986 82 90 82 22 67
Richest 3,860 89 94 89 51 82
Sector
Urban 2,809 97 94 91 51 84
Rural 1,816 74 88 72 14 57
Estate 1,449 72 76 60 3 43
Ethnicity
Sinhalese 1,925 76 92 75 19 61
Tamil 1,920 75 69 63 11 45
Estate Tamil 1,396 76 81 73 4 43
Moor 2,061 91 81 79 23 78
Note: A household has access to 'safe drinking water if it obtains its drinking water from protected well, public tap, tube well, tap within unit, and tap
outside unit). A household has access to 'safe sanitation- if the type of latrine it uses is either water seal or flush toilet A household has access to
'safe cooking fuer if it uses either gas or electricity for cooking.
Source: World Bank, based on 1999/2000 Sri Lanka Integrated Survey.
1.23 In contrast, access to community level economic and social facilities, such as main roads,
post offices, banks, markets, bus stops, and local government offices, measured in terns of
distance and travel time, is similar for poor and non-poor households (Table 1. 13). On average,
.people in Sri Lanka can reach these facilities in 15-30 minutes, with little variation across
consumption quintiles.
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Table 1.13: Access to Economic and Social Facilities by Consumption Quintile, Sector, and
Ethnicity, 199912000 (travel time in minutes)
Grama
Item Main road Post office Bank Market Bus stop Sevaka
Consumption quintile
Poorest 22 22 31 30 28 26
Second 20 22 31 29 24 20
Third 21 20 30 28 25 21
Fourth 20 19 27 26 23 22
Richest 16 15 22 22 20 19
Sector
Urban 11 10 12 13 13 8
Rural 19 18 28 26 24 19
Estate 38 42 50 53 44 32
Ethnicity
Sinhalese 20 20 28 26 24 20
Tamil 21 22 32 28 22 25
Estate Tamil 36 34 50 63 50 45
Moor 13 9 18 21 23 3
Source: Wodd Bank, based on Sr Lanka Integrated Survey 199912000.
1.24 Outside of the conflict areas,
economic welfare and living Box 1.2: Why Do the Poor Lack Assets?
conditions are worst for households
living on estates, most of whom are Lacking assets is botha cause.and an outcome of poverty Poor
Tamils. Estate Tamils are health. deficient!sk,lls, limited access to basic services: and thehumiliabon of sbocil'exclusion refl'ct deprivabons in personal,descendents of workers brought over public, and 'social assets. Humrni, physical, and natural assets
from South India by British also lie at the core" ' .whether an individual, househ6ld, or group
plantation companies during the lives in poverty, or escapes it These assets interact with market -
nineteenth and early twentieth and social oppi6irtUhibts tb generate income, a better quality of
centuries to work on the hill country life,. and a' sense of psy,holgical-w'llbeing Assets are also
plantations. They have the lowest central to coping-with shocks an'd reducing the vulnerability that
consumption levels in Sri Lanka and is a constant feature of.poveity.
the worst basic living conditions. Per
capita consumption in the estate Poor people lack assetsbecause,they live. in poor countries or in
sector is only about half that in the poor regions within communities. Inequality in the distuibuti6n 6f
urban sector and about 80 percent wealth and the benefits of i(ubliU acDon also depnve the poor of
assets In Sri Lanka, for example, 82 percent of the wealthiest
that in the rural sector. Access to households and just 38 percent of the poorest households have
safe cooking fuel (3 percent), access to electricity.
electricity (43 percent), and
sanitation facilities (60 percent) are Source: World Bank, 2000-2001 World Development Repon and World
well below levels in other sectors. Bank estimates tased 6n 1999/2000 Sn Lanka lntegrated Survey
Access to public facilities is also
much more limited, with travel time to main roads, banks, post offices and markets about twice
that in rural areas (Table 1.13). Limited access to public facilities reflects the remoteness of
communities located deep inside large estates and the absence of regular bus transportation.
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1.25 Economic welfare is low and living conditions difficult in other rural areas. Rural
consumption is about two-thirds urban consumption, and access to clean sanitation, good
drinking water, electricity, and safe cooking fuel is much more limited. Travel time to facilities
such as main roads, banks, post offices, and markets is about twice that of urban areas, due
chiefly to longer travel distances and more limited transportation.
1.26 Education and Health Status of the Poor. Sri Lanka's achievements in education and
health have been remarkable. Less than 10 percent of the population is illiterate, and 100 percent
of children are enrolled in school. These strong social indicators have improved the standard of
living, even of households below the poverty line. While poverty is highest among individuals
whose principal income earner has no schooling, such households make up a small percentage of
the poor, a percentage only slightly higher than their share in ,the total population (5 percent)
(Gunewardena 2000). Less than 12 percent of the poor have no schooling (Tables 1.14 and 1. 15),
a percentage similar to the literacy rates in the general population.
Table 1.14: Contribution to Poverty by Education of Household Head,
1 995196(percent)
Poverty line = Rs792 per person Poverty line = Rs.950 per
per month person per month
Level of education
No schooling
Headcount 12 11
Povertygap 13 12
Squared poverty gap 14 13
Primary school
Headcount 43 41
Poverty gap 44 43
Squared poverty gap 45 44
Lower secondaty school
Headcount 25 26
Poverty gap 25 25
Squared poverty gap 25 25
Upper secondary school
Headcount 13 14
Poverty gap 12 13
Squared poverty gap 11 12
GCE O/L
Headcount 6 6
Poverty gap 5 6
Squared poverty gap 5 5
GCEA/L
Headcount 1 1
Poverty gap 1 1
Squared poverty gap 1 1
Graduate and above
Headcount 0 0
Poverty gap 0 0
Squared poverty gap 0 0
Note: Poverty incidence esUmates are based on DCS datasets that exclude the North and East
Source: Gunewardena 2000.
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Table 1.15: Contribution to Poverty by Literacy Rate of Household Head,
1985-96(percent)
Poverty line = Rs792 per person Poverty line = Rs950 per person
per month per month
Literacy status 1985/86 1990/91 1995/96 1985/86 1990/91 1995196
Literate
Headcount 77 76 81 78 78 81
Poverty gap 74 74 .79 76 76 80
Squared poverty gap 73 74 78 74 75 79
Illiterate
Headcount 23 24 19 22 22 19
Poverty gap 26 26 21 24 24 20
Squared poverty gap 27 26 22 26 25 21
Note: Poverty incidence estimates are based on DCS datasets that exclude the North and East.
Sourcer Gunewardena 2000.
1.27 Nearly half of the poor live in households whose principal income earner has some
secondary education. These low returns to education of the poor may reflect the low quality of
their education, the fact that they are unable to make the best use of their education by moving to
activities or areas where returns are higher, or low returns to education in Sri Lanka (as
compared to other countries). Although education is free, the quality of education provided to the
poor is inferior to that provided to richer households, limiting the ability of children of poor
parents to take advantage of the growing economy. Province-level primary learning outcomes do
suggest that here may be significant differences in the quality of education acquired by members
of poor and nonpoor households (Figure 1. 13). Although this effect is not captured by the
existing household surveys, it is possible to identify measurable proxies for education quality,
such as class size or language of instruction. Class sizes in rural areas and estates are
considerably higher than in urban areas. As for the language of instruction, a primary education
in Tamil, for instance, is likely to yield lower market returns than one in Sinhalese or English. A
basic analysis of district-level poverty incidence and English literacy reveals a strong correlation
(Table 1.16). Further research on the relationship between language of instruction and returns to
education could help clarify these effects further.
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Figure 1.13: Proportion of Students Mastering Basic Language and Numerical Skills
45
40
35
|OILiteracy El3Numeracy|
Source: National Institute of Education 1995.
Table 1.16: Poverty incidence, literacy, and language
Province District Poverty incidence Literate in Illiterate
1995/96 Sinhala Tamil English
Western Colombo 10 82 18 39 6
Gampaha 11 93 5 25 5
Kalutara 26 86 11l 22 8
Central Kandy 30 76 22 23 10
Matale 35 75 19 16 14
Nuwara Eliya 21 40 43 12 22
Souther n Galle 25 89 5 22 9
Matara 28 87 4 P e19 11
Hambantohta 27 87 1 12 13
North Westem Kurunegala 34 89 7 15 9
Puttalam 33 80 18 16 7
North Central Anuradhapura 33 87 6 11 10
Polonnaruwa 27 87 5 16 10
Uva Badulla 30 65 22 13 18
Moneragala 49 82 4 10 16
Sabaragarnuwa Ratnapura 37 81 10 16 13
Kegalle 25 84 12 17 9
Note: Correlation coefficient between districtlevel poverty incidence and literacy in English is -0.713.
Poverty inWdence estimates are based on DCS datasets that exlude the North and East.
SouesP overty estimates: Gunewardena 2000; selF-assessed literacy rates by anguage from Demographic Survey 1994.
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1.28 Similarly to education outcomes, there seems to be no consistent differences in the long
term (stunting) or short-term (wasting) nutritional indicators of children in Sri Lanka across
income groups or across provinces according to data from the Sri Lanka Integrated Survey.
Nutritional indicators of children across expenditure quintiles and provinces vary little (see
Tables 1.17 through 1.19). There are significant differences, however, across ethnic groups and
sectors of residence, with nutritional outcomes of estate children (most of whom are ethnically
Indian Tamils) being inferior to those of other ethnic groups and population in the rest of the
country.
Table 1.17: Health Indicators by Expenditure Quintile, 199912000
Quintble of per-capita Proporbton of children Proportion of children Proportion of children wasted
expenditure underweight* stunted"
distibubon
1 (lowest) 25 29 30
2 24 29 27
3 23 32 25
4 19 25 18
5 (highest) 27 27 32
Total 24 29 27
^ underweght is defined as weight for age below 2 standard deviabons from the age and gender specific mean
-stunting is defined as heiht for age below 2 standard deviatons fom the age and gender specific mean
*"wasting is defined as weight for height below 2 standard deviabons from the age and gender specific mean
Source: Workd,Bank, based on 1999/2000 Sn Lanka Integrated Survey, calculabons fmm three quarters.
Table 1.18: Health Indicators by Sector, 1999/2000
Sector Proportion of children Proportion of children Proportion of children
underweight* stunted" wasted
Urban 16 26 20
Rural 24 29 27
Estate 42 37 37
Total 24 29 27
* underweight is defined as weiht for age below 2 standard deviatons from the age and gender specific mean
-stuntng is defined as height for age below 2 standard deviations from the age and gender specific mean
"wasting is defined as weight for height below 2 standard deviabons from the age and gender specific mean
Source: Wodd Bank based on 1999/2000 Sn Lanka Integrated Survey; calculabons from three quarters.
Table 1.19: Health Indicators by Province, 1999/2000
Province Proportion of children Proportion of children Proportion of children wasted
underweight* stunted'
Westemr 20 27 25
Central 21 25 33
Southem 26 24 28
N.Eastern 20 30 20
N.Western 25 36 21
North Central 36 28 33
Uva 30 34 27
Sabaragamnuwa 27 33 32
Total 24 29 27
' underweight is defined as weight for age below 2 standard deviatons from the age and gender specific mean
"stunting is defined as height for age below 2 standard deviabons from the age and gender specific mean
**wastjng is defined as weight for height below 2 standard deviatons from the age and gender specific mean
Soure: Wordd Bank, based on 1999/2000 Sri Lanka Integrated Survey; calculabons from three quarters.
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Poverty and Hardship in the Northeast
1.29 Part of Sri Lanka's difficulties in raising incomes and reducing poverty can be traced to
the civil war, in which an estimatedd Box 1.3: Ethnic Di%ersity and Violence in Sri Lanka
60,000 people have lost their lives. I
Sri Lanka has been immersed in war Sri Lanka's ethnically diverse population comprises an ethnic
for the last 17 years. The majority, ihe Sinhalese, and three-minority groups, the Sri
humanitarian, social and economic Lanikan Tamils, the Indian Tamils, and the NMoors The main
impact of the war is felt most distinguishing characteristic of these groups is language. The
directly by populations in the North mostly Buddhist Sinhalese. who make up 74 percent of the
and East and the areas bordering it. population. speak a language that belongs to the Indo-Aryan
But the effects of the conflict have famrih. The largely Hindu Sri Lankan Tamil minority. which
far reaching economic, social, and represents about 12 percent of the population. speaks Tamil,pa .s wa Dravidian language. The Sri Lank-an Tamils have long
psychological rheptheatrcuson, whi clatrned that the Sinhalese discriminate aganst them.
extend beyond the theatre of battle. Another 6 percent of the population are Indian Tamils, who
Some of the effects of the conflict live apart from the rest of Sri Lankan societv. largely on
include: loss of civilian lives and estates or plantations. -The Mluslims. who represent around 7
psychological trauma, damage to percent of the population, are predominatb. traders and
infrastructure and homes, maintain cordial ties with both the Sinhalese and Tamils.
displacement, restricted mobility in
some areas in the country, Simmering ethnic tensions intensified in 1956, after Sinhala
disruption of local economies, wYas declared the onlh official language, and in 1971, when
disruption of conununity and the rural Sinhalese youth-based mo%ement. the Janatha
institutiona netwo , disrptin . rVimuk-tbi Peamuna (the Peoples' Liberation Front).inlstitutional nletworks, disruptionI Of ... espousing an, ideology combining leftlist populism and
children's education, high Sinhalese nationalism, organized an armed uprising. The
dependence on relief, deterioration uprising was violently crushed by the government Violence
in the health status of the erupted again in 1983, wvhen anti-Tamil violence in the south
population, and widespread led to a mass exodus of Tamils and to support for an armed
vulnerability and-insecurity among struggle for a separate Tamnil state (comprising the Nortern
the population. At the root of the and Eastern provinces of the countryi, led by the Liberarion
problem has been Sri Lanka's Tigers of Tamil Eeiam (LTTE).
inability to forge a multicultural
identity (Boxes 1.3, 1.4 and 1.5).
1.30 Expenditures on the war effort, which have consumed about 5 percent of GDP in recent
years, crowd out a vast range of pro-growth and pro-poor public services. The instability brought
about by the war also reduces investment and job creation. And the protracted conflict fuels
ethnic polarization and discrimination and desensitizes communities to the effects of violence.
1.31 'Direct costs of the war include military expenditures borne by the government (and the.
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) and the costs associated with the destruction of or damage to
physical and social infrastructure. The government's military expenditures increased from 1.3
percent of GDP in 1982, before the outbreak of war, to about 5-6 percent of GDP in 2000.
Arunatilake and others (2000) estimated the economic cost of government's expenditures at
about 41 percent and those of the Liberation Tigers 'of Tamil Eelam at 4 percent of Sri Lanka's
1996 GDP. Adding the costs of providing for refugees and the costs of lost assets yields'a total
direct opportunity cost of 61 percent of Sri Lanka's 1996 GDP. The indirect costs of the war are
at least as high. These costs represent the income lost as a result of forgone domestic investment,
reduced tourism, the decline in foreign direct investment, the human capital loss associated with
death, injury, and displacement.
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Box 1.4: Social Fragmentation and Conflitt
Group differentation by such characteristics as ethnicity, race, religion, and language can sometimes-result in.social
fragmentabon, with groups perceiving themselves as having distinct interests even though they may have similar
socioeconomic status. Ethnicity - a multidimensional phenomenon and a controversial notion - is based on perceived
cultural differences between groups in a society, differences that form-a powerful-source of'identity and a base for
political mobilization (Horowitz, 1999). Common ethnic affiliations can be a basis for bonding social capital, providing
community members with a range of benefits (credit, employment, etc) while.imposing significant obligations and
commitments (financial- support, conformity). Membership in an ethnic community can, also generate negative
externalities, as with conflict between ethnic groups. Such.divisi6ns can be obstacles to collective action.
Ethnicity can become a basis for competition for political power and for access to material resources (Turton, 1997).
Unless institutions.of the state and civil society offer forums for mediating intergroup rivalries and forging cross-cutting
Uies among diverse ethnic groups, these ethnic cleavages can lead to conflicts, tearing a society and economy. apart,
leaving everyone vulnerable to poverty.
Ethnic cleavages affect development outcomes in many ways. They,influence the intemal organizafon ot govemment
and the allocation of public spending, leading to unequal distribution of public goods and services: They encourage
rent seeking, reducing the efficiency of public spending (Alesina et al. 1998). Further-economic distortions enter.when
,powerful ethnic groups-use their political power to increase-their incomes relative to those of others.
The extent to which social fragmentation leads to conflict depends largely on administrative and--political institutons.
To- create -a functioning society, a -whole. range of social and political institutions must work together. By .contrast, .
-breakdowns in :govemance and in the delivery of public goods and related social services create conditions, for social
unrest and conflict-as do breakdowns in the institutions of conflict mediation, such as represenitative politics and the.
rule of law;
Sources: Alesina 1998, Horowitz 1999, Turton 1997, and Worid Bank 2000
1.32 The human and economic costs of the war are felt most directly by populations in the
North East. According to Ministry of Planning estimates, the size of the overall economy of the
Northem Province shrank from US$ 350 to US$ 250 million between only 1990 and 1995,
corresponding to a negative annual average GDP growth of 6.2 percent per year. Poverty
estimates are unavailable for the North East, where conditions make it too difficult to administer
a representative household survey. The 1999/2000 Sri Lanka Integrated Survey (SLIS) attempted
to cover the North East, to the extent it was possible to do so without jeopardizing the lives of
interviewers. However, the difficulties encountered in administering a household survey in war
areas were many. The findings based on the SLIS for the North East will, therefore, not fully
reflect the gravity of the situation in the area due to the following reasons: (i) sampling in the
Northeast is not random (as it was in the rest of the country) due to the very difficult and fluid
security situation and the frequent displacement of entire villages covered during the survey
period; (ii) the survey was unable to cover uncleared areas (areas under L'TTE control) due to
security reasons -- and there is reason to believe that the situation in the uncleared areas may be
worse than in the rest of the country; and (iii) the survey results do not capture the situation in
refugee camps.
1.33 Taking into account these caveats, data from the Sri Lanka Integrated Survey suggest
that household incomes in this region would be among the lowest in Sri Lanka were it not for the
safety net provided by remittances from family members living abroad. However, contrary to
expectations, SLIS data has not shown income or consumption levels in the North East to be
lower than in the rest of the country. Monthly average consumption per capita, adjusted by a
regional prices index to take into account the higher price level in the North and East, is the
second highest in this area, next to consumption in the Westem Province (Annex A, Table A5).
Foreign remittances and labor income from abroad are responsible for ensuring minimum
consumption levels.
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1.34 Other sources reveal high levels of wasting and stunting among children and very poor
nutritional status of women, especially among Tamils living in uncleared areas. Although the
civil conflict in Sri Lanka is confined to the North East, violence has become an islandwide and
endemic feature of Sri Lankan society. Violence has become,a means to attain legitimacy,
wealth, and protection (Goodhand 2000). The much higher incidence of violent crime in Sri
Lanka compared with other South Asian countries may reflect the impact of the conflict.
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1.3 5 The poor bear a disproportionate share of the costs of the war. Faced with fewer
opportunities to earn a living, the rural poor serve in the armed forces on both sides of the
conflict and bear most of the burden in terms of loss of life, injury, dislocation, and trauma.
Households in the North East and villages bordering it are the most severely affected in terms of
their ability to obtain a secure livelihood (Shanmugaratnam, 1999). Virtually every household in
these areas has experienced the impact of the war, through loss of life, assets, or displacement or
as a result of the deterioration of infrastructure that has resulted from the war.
1.36 Among the worst-affected groups are households that have been displaced, sometimes
repeatedly, as a result of conflict in or threats to their home villages. A survey conducted in the
eastern area of Trincomalee indicated that 40 percent of Muslim households and 27 percent of
Tamil households had been displaced and that almost two-thirds of household heads in uncleared
areas were unable to read and Write.8 Displaced families have lost productive assets (agricultural
equipment, livestock, shops, mills), including in some cases lands they had cultivated before
being displaced. Most of the displaced remain in refugee camps, often for years (Box 1.6). Those
who eventually return to their home villages sometimes find that their lands have been
appropriated by other households.
8 Reinhard and Kraemer (1999). Baseline Survey on Health and Nutrition. Ministry of Plan
Implementation and Parliamentary Affairs, Integrated Food Security Programme, Trincomalee.
- 26 -
Box 1.6: The Sithamparapuram Welfare Center
Sithamparapuram ,Welfare'Center is the largest welfare center in the Vavuniya District. This was established in
;1992 to accommodate -the flow of displaced 'people from the war-affected areas including cleared and uncleared
-areas of the Vavuriiya district; such as-Podivikulam:and Cheddikulam, Mullativu, Kilinochchi, Manner and Jaffna'
,Districts. As of April 1999, the total population in this welfare center was 7,341 persons. Mostof the occupants in',
Sithamparapuram are poor They,have lost whatever modest' assets they had due to displacement or attacks.
Their more affluent relatives, and neighbors' had managed to move to Colombo, Vavuniya, Trincomalee and other
urban centers outside of the war zone 'includinrg foreign destinations as they had enough cash to travel to such
locations, secure passes and other identity documents necessary for such a move and seftle in such new
locations. In effect, the, poorest of displaced-people are the ones who remain in welfare centers for'long periods of
time.---.
:Only a -small proportion -of occupants' in the. Sithamparapuram welfare center live in permanent' buiidings.and
m"teorary sheds, while the majority live in thatched huts. Most of,these permanent uildings were either driginal
school buildings or those built by"the 'administrationjfor purposes such as storage and subsequently 'been,
distributed among the newcormers'to.the center. A vast majority of the people live in thatched hutments with mud
Ywalls and cadjan roofs. While, temporarysh'ds.are mainly occupied by a floating populaton from nearby.villages
who move into the center when there is potential danger from fighting and return to their villages once danger
subsides , 
-
-
Source:-Si,lva , 2000
1.37 Death, injury, and displacement statistics can only approximate the extent of human
suffering in the North East. Individuals in the North East are far more likely to suffer personal
injury than households anywhere else in the country, in particular in the Western Province. One
out of every twelve households in the North East reported that a family member was killed as a
result of the civil conflict (Table 1.20). Among the poorest households, in the North East the rate
is even higher with one out of every seven poor households reporting a member killed.
Table 1.20: Households Reported Having a Member Killed as a Result of the Civil Conflict,
by expenditure quintile and province (percentage)
1 (lowest) 2 3 4 5(highest) Total
Westem Province 0 0 0 1 1 0
North and East 15 10 6 8 7 8
Rest of Sri Lanka 1 1 1 1 1 1
Soume: 1999-200 SO Lanka Integrated Survey calculatons from three quarers.
1.38 Displacement as a direct consequence of the war is a striking feature of life in the North
East. Data from the 1999/2000 Sri Lanka Integrated Survey indicates that one of the most
common reasons for changing the place of residence in the North East is the war, and around 10
percent of all households that experienced an episode of mobility in the last 20 years moved,
because of the war. Not only the households residing in the North East are more likely to change
their residence, they are more likely than households in other parts of the country to move more
often. Among those residents of the North East province who have moved in the past 20 years,
17 percent moved 3 or more times. In comparison, respectively 4 and 2 percent of households in
similar circumstances residing in the Western and other provinces of Sri Lanka had moved more
than 3 times.
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1.39 Nearly all households in the North East (97 percent) that moved due to the war suffered
loss of property. Compensation for these losses was rarely paid, and when it was paid well-off
households were more likely to receive compensation for their losses than the poor households: 7
percent of all households who suffered income losses reported receiving compensation, while
none of the households in the two lowest quintiles did.
Table 1.21: Reasons for Household Move by Area of Residence (percentage)
Reasons: Work Available Marriage Other War Resettlement Other
(as reported by the land family
household heads who were reasons
not born in the place of
current residence)
Westem 26 13 41 7 1 3 9
Northand East 10 56 17 3 12 2 1
Rest of Sri Lanka 18 30 31 9 1 4 6
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Chapter 2
Anti-Poverty Programs and Safety Nets
2.1 Sri Lanka's success in improving non-income dimensions of poverty is due to a great
extent to successive government's efforts to provide universal and free education and health care
to the population. The efforts of successive governments, involving expenditures of between 4
and 5 percent of GDP (4 percent in 1997) appear to have paid off, not only for the wealthy, but
also for the poor (Table 2. 1). The poor fare considerably better in some key non-income
dimensions of poverty in Sri Lanka than in most other developing countries. Around 90 percent
of the poor have completed at least primary education. Although health indicators for the poor are
not readily available, indicators such as infant and maternal mortality rates and life expectancy at
birth above 70 years of age, are comparable to those of middle income countries. Although there
is a perception that the quality of public education and health services have been declining, a
rigorous analysis of which is beyond the scope of this study, Sri Lanka's achievements are
nonetheless remarkable.
2.2 As discussed in Chapter I of this report, the effectiveness of Sri Lanka's strategy in
reducing income poverty and vulnerability has been far less remarkable. A key element of this
strategy has been the transfer of public resources to households through untargeted subsidies and
more recently large welfare programs. Welfare programs in Sri Lanka have traditionally covered
a large percentage of the population, including those in upper income strata. This may have
contributed to larger public support for these programs.9 As a result, government expenditures in
social security and welfare programs have been traditionally high, amounting to nearly the
education and health expenditures combined in 1997 (Table 2. 1).
Table 2.1: Social expenditures, Sri Lanka and Comparator Countres
% of govemment expenditure % of GDP
Educaton Health Social Total Educaton Health Social Total
Security and Security and
Welfare Welfare
US$800-1,500 per capita income countries (1999)
Sri Lanka (1997) 9.8 5.3 14.0 29.1 2.5 1.4 3.6 7.5
Egypt (1997) 14:8 3.3 0.5 18.5 4.5 1.0 0.1 5.7
Philippines (1997) 20.3 3.2 2.5 26 3.9 0.6 0.5 5.0
Bolivia (1998) 19.6 3.4 25.9 48.9 4.3 0.7 5.7 10.8
Bulgaria (1998) 29.3 25.8 9.2 64.3 2.3 2.0 0.7 5.0
US$2,000-30,000 per capita income countnies (1999)
Thailand 1998) 23.1 9.2 4.1 36.4 4.3 1.7 0.8 6.7
Malaysia (1997) 22.8 6.3 7.2 36.3 4.5 1.2 1.4 7.1
Singapore 1997) 18.8 6.7 1.8 27.3 3.2 1.1 0.3 4.5
Source: IMF 1999.
9For political economy arguments for nontargeted transfers, see Gelbach and Pritchett (1997). It is
debatable whether there is a need in Sri Lanka to gain popular support for poverty programs, given the
country's socialist tradition and concern for social welfare.
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2.3 In general, governments maintain safety nets to prevent very low standards of living by
means of reducing and mitigating downside socio-economic risk or coping with its occurmnces.
10 The poor in Sri Lanka have access to a variety of mechanisms to cope with shocks, including
government, private and non-governmental arrangements. There are four groups of vulnerable
people in Sri Lanka who could be covered by government safety nets, including: (i) a core group
of people that cannot take advantage of existing opportunities (handicapped and orphans, for
instance); (ii) people "trapped" in pockets of poverty because they face constraints to mobility
and integration, such as the estate or Indian Tamils; (iii) people affected directly by the war,
through death of breadwinner, injury, and displacement; (iv) people affected by catastrophic risk,
such as drought or floods. Instead of focusing only on these vulnerable groups, government
support programs in Sri Lanka have provided income support to a larger share of the population
over extended period of time.
The Government Safety Net in the Late 1990s
2.4 The Sri Lankan Government currently has several social assistance programs and subsidy
schemes. Samurdhi became the largest government social assistance program in 1995, when it
replaced the Janasavyia program, and claims about $170 million per year or 1 percent of GDP
(Table 2.2)." By 1999, two million families-about 50 percent of all families in the country-
were receiving benefits from Samurdhi.'2 Assistance to the displaced and war-affected population
was the second-largest item in the social transfer budget, claiming $63 million-0.3 percent of
GDP. There are several other programs with implicit or explicit safety net functions. Nutrition
intervention programs, Public Assistance, free textbooks and school uniforms, and a school
transport subsidy continued to be provided, as did producer and import subsidies intended to
10 Policies promoting growth and increasing access to health and education services improve the average
well being of the poor; policies that create opportunities for households to manage risk better, thus
reducing the impact of negative shocks, fall under the purview of social protection. It is important to
recognize, therefore, that since poverty and vulnerability are closely linked and reinforce each other, the
policy responses to them overlap considerably and also have important synergies (Risk Management in
South Asia, 2001).
An act of parliament in 1995 stipulated that the main functions of the Samurdhi National Program were
'to improve the economic and social conditions of youth, women and disadvantaged groups of the society
by (a) broadening their opportunities for income enhancement and employment; (b) integrating them into
economic and social development activities; (c) linking family level economic activities with community
development projects at village, district, divisional and provincial levels; (d) mobilizing their participation
in the planning and management of projects and schemes for their upliftment; (e) fostering cooperation
among them, promoting savings amongst them and assisting them to obtain credit facilities; (f) facilitating
the delivery of inputs and services of government departments, public corporations, local authorities,
private sector organizations and nongovernmental organizations to beneficiaries of the program, and to
implement the program so formulated and other programs of the government for poverty alleviation." In
"Samurdhi National Programme for Poverty Alleviation 1999" the Samurdhi Authority of Sri Lanka
restated that "Samurdhi is the national programnne launched by the present government for poverty
alleviation. The main objectives of this program are to provide a solution for the problem of
unemployment which is the most pressing problem among the youth, eradication of poverty from the
country at large, and obtaining the direct participation of the youth in development."
12 The 1999 Central Bank of Sri Lanka Annual Report indicates that Samurdhi covers around 50 percent of
all families in Sri Lanlka, whereas the 1999-2000 Sri Lanka Integrated Survey results show a slightly lower
percentage Samurdhi covering 40 percent of all households. The discrepancy may be due to the fact that
the SLIS covers the Northeast, where Samurdhi is less active, or to definitional issues.
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increase household incomes, including a fertilizer subsidy ($25 million in 1999). In addition,
programs with transfer elements, such as housing development, IRDP, and microfinance
programs, as well as various schemes to create jobs for unemployed educated youth were
administered.
Table 2.2: Social Transfers and Social Expenditure, 1999
Percent of
Millions of Percent of total social
Sn Lankan rupees US$ millions social transfers expenditures
Social transfers
Samurdhi total 10,007 170 56 14
Of which Samurdhi food stamps 8,191 139 46 11
Refugees (dry rations, welfare camps, Unified
Assistance Scheme) 3,700 63 21 5
Of which dry rations 2,661 45 15 4
Public Assistance 2,149 36 12 3
Poor relief nutrtion program 97 2 1 0.1
Triposha 320 5 .2 0.4
Fertilizer subsidy 1,451 25 8 2
Subtotal 17,724 300 100 24.5
Other social subsidies
School uniforms 500 8 0.7
Textbooks 700 12 1
Season tckets 300 5 0.4
Other social expenditures
Pensions 20,723 351 28
Education 22,231 376 31
Health 10,651 180 15
Total 72,829 1,234 100
Sources: Central Bank of Sn Lanka, Ministry of Plan Implementaton, IMF.
Samurdhi: An Evaluation
2.5 Samurdhi's effectiveness in reaching the poor is weak. Estimates from the 1999-2000 Sri
Lanka Integrated Survey (SLIS) indicate that although the transfer component of Samurdhi
reaches 40 percent of Sri Lankan households, it misses 36 percent of households in the poorest
per capita expenditure quintile, those who would be most in need.'3 More than 40 percent of
Samurdhi transfers in the sample were made to the wealthiest 60 percent of the population.
2.6 More importantly, there are substantial and significant differences in the probability of
being a Samurdhi recipient by ethnic status. The patterns of targeting errors are consistent with a
finding of bias against ethnic minorities. Relative to Sinhalese households, Sri Lankan Tamils,
Indian Tamils, and Moors are less likely to receive Samurdhi transfers, controlling for income
13 Quantitative and qualitative information from the 1999-2000 Sri Lanka Integrated Survey was used for
evaluation of the distributional impact of government programs and to discern patterns of household
behavior.
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status and other characteristics that might influence program eligibility. Estate populations,
including poor households, are virtually left out.
2.7 Samurdhi is not an efficient poverty alleviation program. It is too large and unaffordable.
It aims to reduce poverty, but also to create white-collar employment to unemployed youth. The
targeting efficiency of the program is compromised by design flaws that allow for political and
ethnic biases, thus discouraging social cohesion. In addition, the emphasis on large income
support programs such as Samurdhi, have also created a culture of entitlement, which discourages
individual efforts. Other government-run safety net programs-such as the Public Assistance
program that provides assistance to widows, orphans, and the disabled-appear to work better,
but are under-funded.
Box 2.1': Welfare
,"The government has become'the mother and father-of the people." In the- better-off areas; we found thatUthe
Samurdhi grant-is perpetuaUng a-dependency culture bred by the populist policiesotf successive.governments. Most
bene,ficiaries now expect welfare measures as'their right People are constantly,.ooking to the&goverhment.to,provide,
.their'basic necessities. In the better-off villages in Haidummulla; for-example; the operaton of severalrgoverment
and NGO programs has encouraged people to become lazy: they-either feel thatthey-do not need to do anything to
improve their living standards, or they feel that they cannot do anything:for themselves;-Therefore, the goiernrmenti
has to do.itfor them. As the-Samurdhi'Managers in Haldummulla put-it,' ifth:p,ople were given 'hives,f6trear bees;
, tley:would ask the.government to catch and.give them the:bees-aswell., -' '
.Souirc: .Gunatilaka et-al. 1997
2.8 Generating white-collar employment for program administrators is also one of the
program's explicit goals; nearly 10 percent of the overall program budget is allocated to pay
administrators' salaries. Development officers and animators are explicitly considered to be
beneficiaries of Samurdhi program, whether or not they are poor. At the end of 1999, 21,700
young men and women were serving as development officers and animators; their number
increased to 22,700 by the end of 2000. There were 1,780 Samurdhi managers in December 2000.
These officials are selected from among unemployed local youths having at least an 0-level
education. Gunatilaka et al. (1997) report that appointments of these officials are made upon
recommendations from local politicians. Samurdhi is also not a sustainable employment
generation program. In addition to not being conducive to the creation of an effective public
administration, the policy of hiring unemployed youth into the public sector is also unaffordable,
in particular given Sri Lanka's fiscal stress. It is also not justifiable on poverty reduction grounds:
as shown in Part I of this report, only 2 percent of the unemployed are poor, indicating that
unemployment is not a key factor in determining poverty.
2.9 Structure andAdministration. The Samurdhi program has three main components. The
first, which provides a consumption grant transfer (food stamps) to eligible households, is the
largest, claiming 80 percent of the program's budget. The second is a savings and credit program
operated through so-called Samurdhi banks, and loans meant for entrepreneurial and business
development (described later in this chapter). The third component is rehabilitation and
development of community infrastructure through workfare and social or human development
programs. Samurdhi also operates social insurance, funded through compulsory contributions of
beneficiaries of the highest consumption grants.
2.10 The Samurdhi National Program of social assistance was launched by an act of
parliament in 1995. By the end of the 1990s, Samurdhi was fully functioning in 21 of the
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country's 25 districts.14 Its main functions are to improve "the economic and social conditions of
youth, women and disadvantaged groups of the society."15 Originally administered by the
Ministry of Samurdhi, Youth Affairs and Sports, since fall 2000 it has been administered by the
Ministry of Samurdhi and Rural Development and Parliamentary Affairs. Three departments
within the ministry coordinate various Samurdhi functions: the Department of Poor Relief, the
Department of the Commissioner General of Samurdhi, and the Samurdhi Authority. There are
district, divisional, and zonal-level Samurdhi authorities. Samurdhi expenditures amount to nearly
1 percent of GDP; more than 80 percent of expenditures are for the food stamp program (Table
2.3).
Table 2.3: Samurdhi Expenditures, 1999
Program component Expenditure Percent
(millions of SL rupees) of total
Samurdhi relief program (food stamps) 8,190.6 81.9
Monitoring and evaluation 2.5 0.0
Financial Management (recurrent) 828.5 8.3
Subtotal / administration 831.0 8.0
Rural Development program 616.8 6.2
Agricultural Development 7.1 0.1
Human Resources and InsUtutional Development 116.6 1.2
MarkeSng 10.0 0.1
Banking and financial actvities 201.8 2.0
Animal Husbandry and Fishery 3.2 0.0
Industial and vocatonal skills development 8.0 0.1
Financial Management (capital) 17.5 0.2
Social Development (human development) 4.8 0.1
Subtotal capital and credit projects 985.9 9.9
Total 10,007.4 100.0
Source: Ministry of Samurdhi, Youth Affairs, and Sports, Summary of Finandal Progress, 1999.
2.11 Program monitoring and evaluation are done at the national level by the Ministry of Plan
Implementation. Divisional secretaries and district assistant Samurdhi commissioners are
supposed to conduct monthly progress review meetings. There is no external (third-party or
NGO) monitoring of progress or any random checks of beneficiary selections.
2.12 Four features of Samurdhi should be noted at the outset. First, program administrators are
considered among the beneficiaries of the program, even though they are not necessarily poor
themselves; 8 percent of the total Samurdhi budget is allocated for their salaries. Second,
beneficiaries of the highest consumption grants pay a premium to finance a social insurance
program available to all eligible households. Third, the same beneficiaries contribute 20 percent
of the value of their stamps in lieu of "forced savings." These "savings" are unavailable for
14 In late 2000, the program was still not in full operation in some districts of the Northeast (Jaffna,
Mannar, Killinochi, Mullaitivu).
5 Parliament of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka. "Samurdhi Authority of Sri Lanka Act,
No. 30 of 1995."
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withdrawal until after four years. Fourth, multipurpose cooperative stores are the only places
where stamps can be exchanged for goods. These stores belong to a de facto government-
managed distribution network administered by the Ministry of Co-operatives and Development.
2.13 Development officers, "animators" (niyamakas in Sinhalese or ukkuvipalar in Tamil),
and Samurdhi managers administer the program. Initially, the majority of animators were hired as
temporary workers, with monthly salaries of Rs. 2,000. In 1999, almost all of them were
promoted to permanent development officers, and their salaries doubled before being increased
again to Rs. 5,000 in August 2000. Animators and development officers are responsible for
identifying families that deserve assistance (according to instructions from the Commissioner of
Poor Relief) and for distributing that assistance. They are expected to convene meetings of
Samurdhi Societies (Samurdhi recipients and poor families) and Samurdhi Force (local youth
groups). The Samurdhi Task Force is in charge of identifying infrastructure projects and other
activities.
2.14 Development officers trained in banking procedures conduct the activities of Samurdhi
banks. About 5,000 persons were trained in banking operations as of April 2000. Development
officers and animators are also expected to supervise poor famnilies who are saving in small
groups-"like a teacher and thereafter like a friend." Program officers are expected to maintain a
list of pregnant anemic women and malnourished children. Most commonly, development
officers and animators receive a three-day training course in general operations, social
mobilization, and leadership skills. Those involved in banking receive more extensive training in
the form of three one-week courses. Training is carried out by the staff of the divisional
secretaries, Samurdhi authorities, and consultants.
2.15 Eligibility and Use of Food Stamps. Households with a combined monthly income of
less than Rs: 1,000 are eligible for consumption grants. Program development officers and
animators screen potential beneficiaries using household questionnaires about income sources,
living conditions, possession of durable goods, and Janasaviya and food stamp receipts (Table
2.4).
Table 2.4: Samurdhi Eligibility Criteria
Monthly household income in rupees and household size Grant size (rupees per month)
Before August 2000 After August 2000
Less than Rs. 500, 4 or more members 1,000 1,000
Rs. 500-999, 3 or more members 500 700
Less than Rs. 1,000, 2 members 200 350
Less than Rs. 1,000, 1 member 100 250
Former Janasaviya recipients 250 400
Graduating Samurdhi membersa 125
'Once household income exceeds Rs. 2,000 Samurdhi members must graduate, but they stll can receive Rs. 125 to cover their social insurance
contribubon (Rs. 25) and compulsory savings (Rs.100).
Source: Ministry of Samurdhi.
2.16 Samurdhi officials widely admit that since income is not easily verifiable, means testing
alone does not identify the poor. Moreover, the officially established threshold is artificially low.
Animators are thus advised to use other characteristics of welfare in conjunction with means
testing to identify beneficiaries. After one-time identification, a list of potential beneficiaries was
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compiled and displayed in public places. The grievances were considered by the Samurdhi Task
Force.
2.17 Households identified as beneficiaries receive a supply of stamps every six months. The
stamps are validated for use at multipurpose cooperative stores at the beginning of each month.
There are multiple reports of inferior quality in these stores and inconvenient hours of operation.
Contributing labor is a mandatory requirement for Samurdhi beneficiaries, but it is not always
enforced.
2.18 When a household's income exceeds Rs. 2,000 and remains at that level for more than six
months, or when a household member finds employment, the household must exit the program.
Family members of military personnel are exempted from this rule. If a household changes its
place of residence, it must be tested and enrolled at a new location, and there is reluctance to
enroll new beneficiaries. Eligible extended families residing in one dwelling usually receive only
one grant.
2.19 Effectiveness and Outcomes. The following analysis of Samurdhi focuses on evaluating
distributional outcomes of the program's food stamp component.16 Rather than being a safety net
for a group of households in need, Samurdhi more closely resembles an income support program.
Using a representative household survey (Sri Lanka Integrated Survey), distributions from the
program are measured across households with different welfare ranks. Welfare ranking of
households is determined on the basis of their position in the per capita expenditure distribution
before receiving the transfer. All households in the Sri Lanka Integrated Survey sample were
divided into five groups (quintiles), each with the same number of individuals. Expenditure
measures were adjusted by province-specific price indices that represented differences in the cost
of living of the low-income populations.
2.20 Households with low relative welfare are more likely to receive Samurdhi assistance; that
is, the program's incidence is progressive. However, transfers miss 36 percent of households
ranked in the lowest expenditure quintile, while a substantial number of households with higher
relative welfare receive Samurdhi consumption grants and other forms of Samurdhi assistance.
Around 40 percent of the total Samurdhi transfer budget is spent on households from the third,
fourth, and fifth quintiles-those whose members are relatively well off. These targeting
outcomes are inferior to the outcomes of targeted programs in other countries.
2.21 Food grants cover more than 20 percent of the food costs of low-income households
receiving Samurdhi but, as expected, Samurdhi transfers have considerably lower impact on the
welfare of the better-off households. Forty percent of the total Samurdhi envelope is spent on
about 2 percent of the food expenditures of households in the richest 60 percent of the population.
16 This evaluation does not assess the behavioral response of households to receiving Samurdhi income.
However, theoretical considerations indicate that a household will change its behavior with respect to
labor supply, investrnent, and consumption decisions, and well as to its efforts to seek private transfers
within and across households or time, in response to govemment grants. Empirical evidence of increased
demand for leisure was found by Sahn and Aldernan (1996) in Sri Lanka. There is a widespread
perception in Sri Lanka that successive transfer programs including Samurdhi do have the effect of
reducing effort. Large government transfers may also displace private transfers (Cox and Jimenez, 1992
and 1995).
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2.22 Analysis of the probability of receiving Samurdhi grants in a multifactorial framework
indicates that factors that generally correspond to the notion of low welfare-large household
size, low income, disability, landlessness, no access to electricity or latrines-are associated with
a higher probability of Samurdhi receipt. After controlling for income, place of residence, and
other factors, there are still substantial and significant differences in the probability of being a
Samurdhi recipient by ethnic status. Compared to Sinhalese households, Sri Lankan Tamils,
Indian Tamils, and Moors are less likely to receive Samurdhi.
2.23 Even though the goals of Samurdhi are to improve the economic and social conditions of
youth, women, and disadvantaged groups, the program's resource allocation and design reveal it
as an income maintenance program that also provides public employment.
2.24 As an income-maintenance program Samurdhi is not effective. Features of Samurdhi-
substantial errors of exclusion and inclusion and the non-randomness of these errors-reflect
flaws in the design of the program that allow for the possibility of deliberate omission of certain
groups of vulnerable individuals. The types of errors indicate that identifying the poor is not an
informational problem, and suggest that unless the incentives faced by program administrators are
fundamentally changed or the administrators are replaced, improvements in directing resources to
the poor are unlikely to occur.
2.25 In addition, there are efficiency losses in the process of exchanging stamps for goods in
the public multipurpose cooperative stores. Second-best arguments can be made in favor of using
in-kind transfers to encourage certain types of behavior (for example, providing school lunches so
that parents will bring children to school) or using low-quality goods as an element of self-
targeting. 17 But since there is no particular behavior to encourage and the costs of administration
are high, there seems to be no good reason to require that purchases be made from particular
stores.
2.26 Empirical Evaluation of Food Transfer Distribution. Households with low relative
welfare are more likely to receive Samurdhi assistance; that is, the program's incidence is
progressive (Table 2.5). However, Samurdhi misses 36 percent of households ranked in the
lowest expenditure quintile, while 30 and 14 percent of households from two highest expenditure
quintiles receive Samurdhi consumption grants. The size of the transfer is slightly larger among
the households in the lowest quintile, but in per capita terms, the grant is larger for the better-off
households. The average Samurdhi transfer is Rs. 403, which translates into Rs. 88 per person in
per capita terms.
17 The best policy would be to provide information on the benefits of the desired behaviors and let
households decide.
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Table 2.5: Samurdhi Food Stamps
1 5
Quinfile (lowest) 2 3 4 (highest) Total
N (sample size) 463 514 510 560 618 6,534
Beneft incidence and average amount of transfer (conditional on receiving transfer)
Incidence (percent) 64 53 42 30 14 40
Rupees, per household 403 390 378 362 303 381
Rupees, per capita 88 96 93 105 107 95
After compulsory deductions
Rupees, per household 322 315 307 301 260 310
Rupees, per capita 71 78 77 88 94 78
Excluding Janasavia households
Incidence 53 41 32 21 11 31
Rupees, per household 359 334 320 291 251 326
Rupees, per capita 79 83 79 84 82 81
Samurdhi food transfer as share of household food expendfture
Conditonal on being a recipient 21 12 10 9 8 14
Unconditonal 14 7 4 3 1 6
After compulsoiy deductions
Conditonal on being a recipient 18 10 8 7 7 11
Unconditional 11 5 3 2 1 5
Source: Calclations from 3 quarters 1999/2000 Sr Lanka Integrated Survey.
2.27 After applying compulsory deductions for savings and social insurance, the amount of the
average transfer falls to Rs. 322 per household and Rs. 71 per person. Excluding former Janasavia
recipients-who receive grants of Rs. 250 (Rs. 400 after August 2000) due to the government's
legal obligations under the previous social assistance program-does not change the relative
distribution of transfers.
2.28 Among households that receive Samurdhi, an average of 14 percent of total household
food expenditure is supplied by the Samurdhi grant."8 The impact on the welfare of households in
the lowest quintiles is considerably larger than on higher-income households. Around 21 percent
of total food expenditures of the lowest quintile households are financed from the Samurdhi food
stamp grant, whereas in households in the second lowest quintile only 12 percent of total food
expenditures comes from Samurdhi. The program's impact on consumption of the richest 60
percent of the population is even smaller, ranging from 1 to 8 percent of total food consumption.
Forty percent of the total Samurdhi transfer budget (based on the sample) goes to households in
the third, fourth, and fifth quintiles-that is, to those who are relatively well off (Table 2.6).
'
8 Total food consumption includes home-produced and home-consumed goods.
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Table 2.6: Food Stamp Distribution by Population Quintile
1 5
Quintile (lowest) 2 3 4 (highest) Total
Reported receipts 33 27 20 14 .6 100
After compulsory deductons 32 27 20 14 7 100
Excluding Janasaviya households 34 27 20 13 6 100
Source: 1999-2000 Sr Lanka Integrated Survey; calculafons from three quarters.
2.29 How do these targeting outcomes in Sri Lanka compare to programs elsewhere? The
targeting outcomes of Samurdhi are inferior to the outcomes of targeted programs in other
countries; in fact, they are comparable with the outcomes of untargeted systems (such as primary
health care or primary education). The practical difficulties of administering targeted programs
are well known, and the way to judge whether these outcomes are successful or not, is to compare
them with the outcomes of simnilar programs in other countries. Grosh (1994) reviewed the design
and targeting outcomes of 47 government systems in Latin America. Across the considered
countries, a median targeted program delivered more than 70 percent of all benefits to the poorest
40 percent of the households. A median untargeted program had outcomes close to Samurdhi,
transferring about 60 percent of the total budget to the poorest 40 percent of households.
Examples of such programs are primary health care and primary education. The administrative
cost of a median program using individual assessment as a targeting method is reported at about 9
percent of the total program cost, which is comparable with the administrative cost of Samurdhi
(8 percent).
2.30 Who does and does not receive Samurdhifood stamps? We used a multifactorial
framework and a series of models that relate the characteristics of households to their probability
of being selected as a Samurdhi beneficiary to investigate the determinants of the probability of
being a Samurdhi recipient. We begin with a model relating the probability of being a Samurdhi
recipient to the exogenous demographic and geographical characteristics of households, as well
as their pretransfer income (model 1).'9 A second model-model fl-uses with the same outcome
measures and a larger set of factors normally associated with low welfare (possession of land and
durable goods, type of energy used, access to latrines, presence of chronically sick members (see
Annex A,Table A8). Estimates cover the entire country except for the North East province, since
Samurdhi was introduced there much later and may still not be functioning fully.
19 Pretransfer income is not an exogenous characteristic and might be affected by unobservables, which would in tum
affect the probability of selection. Other behavioral responses of participation also might lead to changes in income.
These considerations were not addressed in the above.
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Table 2.7: Model I-Probability of Receiving a Samurdhi Grant (Survey Probit Regression)
Scaled
Variable Coefficient Standard error T P>Itj coefficient
Number of children 0-7 years old -0.036 0.041 -0.863 0.389 -0.535
Number of children 8-17 years old 0.016 0:027 0.571 0.568 0.369
Number of elderly -0.014 0.037 -0.366 0.715 -0.055
1, if no men in the household 0.174 0.094 1.861 . 0.064 1.041
Household size 0.107 0.020 5,241 0.000 1.000
Type of settlement, traditional village omitted
1, if irrigation colony -0,289 0.145 -1.996 '0.047 -5.425
1, if expansion colony 0.251 0.173 1.446 0.149 0.626
1, if settlement scheme -0.008 0.124 -0.064 0.949 -1.776
1, if plantation or estate -0.649 0.223 '-2.909 0.004 -7.531
1, if urban low income neighborhood -0:143 0.178 -0.800 0.424' 0.587
1, if urban mid.income neighborhood -0;462. 0.112 -4.115 0.000 -6.230
Province, Westem omitted
1, if Central 0.384 0.112- 3.427 0:001 3.864
1, if Southem 0.449 0.100 4.51,1 -0.000 3.873
1, if North Westem -0.535 0.112 4.760 0.000 4.083
1, if North Central 0.490 0.119 4.124- 0.0000 4.755
1, if Uva 0.347 0.130 2.667 0.008 2.829
1, if Sabaragamuwa 0.545 0.111 4.916 0.000. 4.193
Ethnicity of the household head, Sinhalese omitted
1, if ethnicity is Sri Lankan Tamil -0.490 0.121 -4.046 0.000 -3.018
1, if ethnicity Indian Tamil -0.741 0.197 -3.761 '0.000 -4.269
1, if ethnicity is Moor -0.358 0.125 -2.858 '0.005 -3.803
1, if ethnicity is other -0.514 0.-376 -1.369 0.172'. -5.729
Log household income, less Samurdhi -0.291 0.032 '-9.088 -0.000 -2.535
Constant 1.505 0.268 5.604 0.000 13.106
Number of observations = 4762; Number of strata = 2; Number of PSUs = 325; F(22, 302) = 13.50; Prob > F = 0.0000
Note: Shaded if (jointly) significant at 5 percent level; absolute coefficient values in probit model cannot be interpreted as marginal effects; scaled
coefficients measure the effect of particular characteristics relative to the effect of household size.
Source: 1999-2000 Sr Lanka Integrated Survey; calculations from three quarters.
2.31 Findings from model I show large disparities across provinces and types of settlement
(Table 2.7). Conditional on their real income level, households residing in urban middle-income
neighborhoods, irrigation colonies, and estates are least likely to receive Samurdhi grants. Results
also show an effect of ethnicity: Controlling for income and area of residence, Sri Lankan Tamils,
Indian Tamils, and Moors are all less likely to receive Samurdhi than are Sinhalese households.
Large households are more likely to receive Samurdhi food stamps, as are households without
adult males. Household income is an important determinant of eligibility.
2.32 Estimations from model II confirm the findings of model I with respect to the ethnic
differences in benefit receipt and attest to the notion that households with characteristics of low
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welfare are more likely to be Samurdhi recipients. Factors that generally correspond to the notion
of low welfare-large household size, low income, disability, landlessness, no access to
electricity or latrines-are associated with a higher probability. of Samurdhi receipt. Specifically,
households with disabled or chronically sick members are more likely to receive Samurdhi
assistance. Households owning livestock and other assets are less likely to receive assistance.
Land ownership is the most significant determinant of assistance grants.
2.33 The probabilities of grant receipt differ significantly by'the occupation of the household
head. Households headed by farm laborers and households with members in the military are more
likely to receive assistance. Housing conditions, too, appear to be associated with the probability
of receipts. Households with no access to latrines or to communal latrines are more likely to
receive assistance than households with private latrines. Energy source also seems to be an
important correlate of receiving Samurdhi. Households that use kerosene for lighting or have no
sources of lighting are more likely to receive Samurdhi than are households with access to
electricity.
2.34 In addition to allowing for ethnic and location biases, Samurdhi may also have become
politicized. Qualitative work, from the Sri Lanka Integrated Survey and other sources such as
Gunatilaka et al. 1997 and Asian Development Bank 200 1, suggests that this may already be the
case (Box 2.2), with party affiliation and voting preference reportedly influencing allocation of
Samurdhi consumption grants. This happens partly because there are no strict rules for program
eligibility and not enough checks and balances to prevent Samurdhi officers from acting on the.
demands of politicians.
Box 2.2 Politicization of Samurdhi.
There, is,a widespread perception.that Samurdhi is politcized,. much.3ike its predecessor, Janasaviya.
A'study bythe Institute of Policy Studies reports that 'poliUical-affiliafion determined the eligibility. of some to.receive the
consumpton granrt.... This problem' was confirmed by several Samurdhi- Managerst,and nyamakas we spoke,to., The
niya'rnakas-'said that they are: under pressure from area: poliicians and. vi1age-level party' organizations to,.give the.
Sa'nurdhi grantto,PA faniiies and:to deny.the'nto UNP supporters... Public sector'employees whopasted posters for
p.liticians during the loca govemmeritn electons success,fully,pettioned and'got theinselves-selected for Samurdhi in
the .second 'round.'
Source'. Gunatilaka et al. 1997.
A..tudy by'Parker and Silva (2000) also suggests perceptoris of unfaimiess in the selection of both the Samurdhi
adrninistrators and the beneficiaries of Samurdhi transfers. "Although a:number_ of points bf criticism were raised,
unfaimess. in the:selection of both Samurdhi.animators (niyamakas) and beneficiaries was the complaint heard: most
often.about the Samurdhi program. The pnmary abuse. appears to be the inclusion.of:large' numbers6f'indligible
households 'as a-reward for political loyalty to the governing paryt in rmany of the villages visited; half or more, of the
village.households were found to be receiving Samurdhi benefits. 'Report§iwere:heard of party organizers attractihg
voters. to-the party with the- promise of Samurdhi benefits. Less commonly, Samurdhi 'has been utlized to threaten:or
punish low-income supporters of the opposition party. 'In. some' villages; eligible Samurdhi recipients who are.not
supporters of the ruling party were,told that if they ventured to vote in an upooming election, they would be removed
from'the Samurdhi lists and their-benefits would be terminated. Although errors or abuses of exclusion appear to be
far(less- comnon than errors:of inc!usion, they nevertheless-exist.'
Sburce:Parkerand'Silva 2000. -
2.35 Allocations of Samurdhi Transfers Between and Within Provinces. The allocation of
benefits across provinces corresponds to poverty rates, that is,: poorer provinces and districts are
allocated a higher amount of Samurdhi transfers in per capita terms. Identifying the poor on the
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ground is less successful. Within the province, provinces with higher poverty rates are less
effective in reaching their poor than are richer provinces. Correlation between funds allocated to
each district and district-specific poverty measures are presented in Table 2.8. The correlation
between per capita district-specific Samurdhi funds and poverty rate (depth) is .814 (.711). This
high positive correlation attests that allocation of Samurdhi assistance at the central level is pro
poor. It also suggests that most targeting errors are due to misallocation at the local level. Poorer
provinces allocate smaller shares of their Samurdhi funds to their poor (Table 2.9). Specifically,
the correlation between the share of province-specific Samurdhi funds transferred to the poorest
strata and province-specific poverty indicators ranges between -.454 and -.789.
Table 2.8: Food Stamps Issued to Districts and Welfare Indicators
1999 total Stamps per Poverty and welfare indicators
(millions of Populabon person
rupees) (thousands) (rupees) Average
Poverty expenditure Gini
District Poverty rate depth (rupees)
Colombo 375 2,057 182 10 1.77 2038 0.35
Gampaha 710 1,708 416 11 1.8 1720 0.31
Kalutara 384 938 410 26 5.78 1392 0.33
Kandy 557 1,221 456 30 7.04 1321 0.34
Matale 290 423 686 35 8.53 1096 0.28
Nuwara Eliya 181 671 270 21 3.61 1145 0.22
Galle 462 955 483 25 5.62 1323 0.31
Matara 448 754 594 28 5.84 1214 0.28
Hambantohta 338 516 655 27 5.4 1234 0.29
Kurunegala 986 1,378 715 34 7.06 1093 0.27
Puttalam 396 601 660 33 6.69 1105 0.26
Anuradhapura 461 676 681 33 6.15 1143 0.28
Polonnaruwa 191 332 576 28 6.45 1240 0.29
Badulla 321 750 428 30 6.44 1139 0.27
Moneragala 269 365 737 49 14.47 927 0.30
Ratnapura 664 917 725 37 8.26 10921 0.28
Kegalle 389 760 512 25 5.07 1230 0.28
Trincomalee 146 .. .. ..
Ampara 332 .. .. ..
Batticaloa 263 .. .. ..
Vavuniya 27 .. .. ..
Pearson correlabon: Stamps per person and column 1 0.7109 -1 -0.311
Source: Samurdhi Authority and Gunewardena 2000.
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Table 2.9: Distribution of Samurdhi Consumption Grants across Province-Specific Quintiles of Per
Capita Expenditure Distribution and Welfare Indicators (percent)
No access No access
1 5 Poverty Poverty to safe to safe
Province (lowest) 2 3 4 (highest) rate depth water sanitaton
Western 33.0 32.9 18.8 12.3 2.5 14 2.6 18 11
Central 27.0 24.3 16.6 22.7 9.4 28 6.2 26 24
Southern 31.8 21.6 25.5 15.5 5.7 26 5.6 35 20
North Westem 27.4 21.9 23.1 19.5 8.1 34 7 35 30
North Central 22.3 20.7 27.8 15.7 13.6 31 6.3 48 32
Uva 27.4 28.3 22.8 14.0 7.6 37 9.5 45 34
Sabaragamuwa 32.1 21.2 23.0 13.4 10.2 32 6.8 32 23
Pearson correlaton: share accrued to the first quintile and column -0.534 -0.454 -0.694 -0.789
Pearson correlaton: share accrued to the first two quintiles and column -0.667 -0.486 -0.712 -0.738
Note: Province-specific quintiles of per capita expenditure are used in the investgation of Samurdhi distributon within provinces.
Source: Calcula6ons from three quarters of Sr Lanka Integrated Survey and National Human Development Report.
Assistance to Displaced Persons and to Populations Affected by War
2.36 The govemment operates assistance programs for 800,000 intemally displaced persons,
200,000 of whom live in government welfare centers. Govemment initiatives include providing
(i) dry food rations for displaced persons, both inside and outside of welfare camps, (ii) operation
of welfare camps, and (iii) resettlement and relocation grants, along with other types of
compensation, under the Unified Scheme of Assistance. The government also provides transfers
under several smaller schemes. 20,21 Total govemrnment expenditures under these schemes
amounted to Rs. 3.7 billion in 1999 (0.3 percent of GDP). Despite these considerable efforts, the
war-affected population remains vulnerable. Restrictions on the mobility of intemally displaced
persons and people living in welfare camps, as well as restrictions on flows of goods and services
to the war-affected areas, exacerbate the problems of this population.
2.37 Dry rations. Intemally displaced persons are eligible for dry rations provided as stamps
redeemable in retail outlets of multipurpose cooperatives and as in-kind food items. The most
recent estimates indicated that 730,000 persons were receiving dry rations in late 2000. Most
recipients live in districts of the North East in "cleared" and "uncleared" areas, but displaced
persons staying with friends and relatives in other provinces also received dry rations.
2.38 The amount of the monthly benefit ranges from Rs. 336 for a family of one to Rs.1,260
for a family of five. Those amounts are equivalent to 0.25 and 0.95 of the median per capita
income in Sri Lanka in 1999. Government funds are channeled through the Commissioner
General for Essential Services (CGES), and identification of beneficiaries is devolved to the local
administration. In 1999 the CGES spent Rs. 2,331.3 million on dry rations.
20 These smaller schemes include economic assistance to fishermen affected by the ban on fishing and
assistance to the "poorest of the poor" in lieu of the Samurdhi in Jaffna. Little is available about actual
incidence of those programs.
21 UNCHR estimates; government estimates for the same time period (730,000 persons in total and 171,000
persons in welfare camps) are lower, and are based on the number actually receiving dry rations.
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2.39 Welfare Camps and Resettlement and Relocation Grants. According to the government
estimates, CGES houses 171,000 people in 348 welfare centers in 14 districts. Maintenance
expenses amounted to Rs. 72 million in 1999. Dry rations to households in welfare camps are
provided by the World Food Program (WFP) through the Department of Social Services
(Ministry of Social Services and Housing Development). Welfare camps vary from abandoned
buildings, schools, and hospitals to huts and communal shelters. The Unified Scheme of
Assistance provides compensation to internally displaced persons who suffered injuries or
property damage, and to families of war casualties. Households in welfare camps are also eligible
for certain grants. The program is administered by the Resettlement and Rehabilitation Authority
of the North.
2.40 These are substantial efforts. But the population on both sides of the conflict remains
greatly affected. Loss of personal property and employment, loss of a breadwinner, risk of
disability, and risk of recurrent displacement are elements of everyday life. As their ties with
communities are broken and their assets are lost, the displaced lose access to traditional risk-
coping mechanisms. Civilian populations living in the conflict areas have limited access to basic
services, and their ability to earn income is compromised by restrictions on the flow of goods.
They are often caught in the crossfire. People living in welfare camps also often lack access to
services, informal networks, and income opportunities.
2.41 The major challenges for internally displaced persons are the long-term nature of the
conflict, the recurrent nature of the displacement, and diminishing opportunities for people to
return to their villages of origin (UNCHR and Consortium of Humanitarian Agencies 2000).
Many internally displaced persons have lived in welfare centers for six or seven years. Their
relocation is imperative. However, those who are resettled sometimes show slow recovery.
Relations with the host communities are sometimes tense and newcomers often lack property
rights in their newly acquired homesteads. Restrictions on freedom of movement and the pass
system prevent inhabitants of welfare camps from reaching schools and hospitals and from
seeking income opportunities. The most persistent consequences of the war will be felt by
children and adolescents. Children affected by the war exhibit higher rates of malnutrition, lack of
access to education, and reportedly suffer physical abuse and sexual harassment, experiences that
will have profound effects on their productivity in the future.
Other Government Programs
2.42 Nutrition Programs. The incidence of low birth weight, undemutrition among young
children, and anemia among pregnant women in Sri Lanka is fairly high (Box 2.3). The
govermment has been addressing the nutritional status of young children for at least two decades
with direct in-kind transfers and other programs. The largest nutrition program, Triposha, was
started by CARE in 1973 and provided a fortified food supplement to malnourished mothers and
preschool children. In 1987 CARE tumed over school feeding to the Sri Lankan government. The
World Bank's 1995 Sri Lanka Poverty Assessment concluded on the basis of an independent
evaluation (Marga Institute 1990) that Triposha in its present form was not up to the task of
eliminating the problem." The program is still in place without any significant modifications.
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Box 2.3, Nutrition Indicators in-Sri-Lanka
Nearlyhallf of all children underfive years-old and non-pregnant-women' nithe co-untry are-e.stimatepdtosbe anemic.
Chrbnici m'alhutition,(stuntihg)-affects 24 percent of all,children under five, ahd 16,percent sufferiacute undernutrition
(wasting): 38 percent:df4al children in this age group are underweight(Health Ministry 1998)-; ron deficiehcy anemia
and'maInlutrition are most pervasive in rain-fed dry zones'of the Uva, Norfi_Centra!_and No'rth Western provinces.
Recent studies in the northeast region'suggest that the highest rates:of maainutrition.mayy-n6Wbefound in the-areas
affected directly',-;by t'hei co0 ct.
Souiee: Tudawe and Wickremnanayake 1998.
The-1994 Nutritidn and Health Survey (NHS4) reveals that a third of.ali nonpregnant niothers in Sri Lanrka;are'
undernourished. There is-large variation in:the incidence of maternal malnutrition across,'sect6rs and income groups;
but maternal:undemourishment represents alproblem even for the.relative1y well-'6ff* Populations in'the estate sector
show the:highest incidence of matemal:undemourishment.
Undernourished: Mothers by Sector and Income (percent)-
Sector' Income quartile
Urban21 1 Lowest 45.7
RuraV:43.3. .Second 41.1
Estate 58.6; Third 31:.4
Highest 18.2
Overall:33.;4'
Soure: Rarnanujam and Nestel 1997.
2.43 The Poor Relief Nutrition Program distributes monthly nutrition cards worth Rs. 100 to
lactating mothers. A total of 80,718 cards costing Rs. 97 million were distributed in 1999.
Beneficiaries are identified by Samurdhi development officers. Nutrition cards can be exchanged
for food in multipurpose cooperative stores.
2.44 Several other programs have components to improve nutrition outcomes. The Nutrition
Intervention Program undertakes a set of activities including vitamin supplement and nutrition
awareness programs. The Plan of Action for Children has the goal of reducing iron and iodine
deficiency disorders. Both programs are administered by the Ministry of Health and Indigenous
Medicine and by provincial ministries of health.
2.45 Old Age Security. Sri Lanka has entered a demographic transition, with the proportion
of elderly expected to double by 2025. In the near future, the country will have to address safety
net policies for those elderly who are poor and lack other means of support. At present, however,
increase in support to the elderly is not expected to have a significant effect on poverty. Overall,
the elderly are not over-represented among the poor, according to the Integrated Survey.
However, there is a large regional variation in the income of the rural elderly. The elderly living
in urban areas have a relatively higher standard of living. In the Uva, Sabaragamuwa, and Central
regions, by contrast, the elderly are over-represented among the relatively worse off. The elderly
living alone are over-represented among the households in the very bottom and very top
expenditure quintiles.
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2.46 Currently, government pensions are more likely to be received by the relatively well off,
since access to public or formal employment provides a relatively higher standard of living.
Analysis of the Sri Lanka Integrated Survey shows that whereas 6 percent of all households
receive government pensions and 2 percent receive EPF/ETF payments, 14 percent of households
in the top quintile of spending received pensions and only 2 percent in each of the two lowest
quintiles benefited from government pensions (Table 2.10). Among the households from the top
expenditure quintile with members over 60 years of age, 26 percent receive government pensions.
The distribution of pension funds across provinces shows that 50 percent of the total pension
envelope observed in the Sri Lanka Integrated Survey sample accrues to households in Western
province. Central province is the second-largest recipient of pensions, accounting for 14 percent
of the total envelope. Uva and North-Central provinces received the lowest proportions of the
total-2 percent each.
Table 2.10: Incidence and Distribution of Public Transfers, 1999-2000
(percent)
1 5
Quintile (lowest) 2 3 4 (highest) Total
Incidence of public transfers overpopulation quintiles
Govemment pensions 1.6 2.1 3.9 6.6 14.3 5.9
Widow and orphan pension funds 1.1 1.6 1.4 1.5 2.9 1.7
Other pensions 0.0 0.1 0.4 0.0 0.2 0.2
Assistance from Sodal Service
Department. 5.0 1.5 1.3 1.0 1.0 1.9
Employer Provident Fund (EPF/ETF) 1.7 1.5 2.0 2.6 3.8 2.4
Distribution of public transfers overpopulation quintiles
Government pensions 4 6 10 22 58 100
Widow and orphan pension funds 6 9 15 10 61 100
Other pensions 0.5 0.5 89 0 10 100
Assistance From Social Service
Department 50 15 13 9 13 100
Employer Provident Fund (EPF/ETF) 7 8 13 21 51 100
Source: 1999-2000 Sn Lanka Integrated Survey; calculations from three quarters.
2.47 The pension system is a responsibility of the formal sector and consists of pension
schemes and savings funds. The Public Sector Provident Fund (PSPF) is mandatory for
government employees who are not entitled to a civil service pension. All non-government
employees in the formal sector are required to participate in the government-administered
Employees Trust Fund (ETF) and the Employment Provident Fund (EPF) or another approved
provident fund. Outside the mandatory schemes, several government-administered voluntary
pension schemes offer retirement benefits to farmers, fishermen, and the self-employed.22
Widows and orphans of participants in EPF receive pensions. The distribution of these benefits is
22 A provident fund is a saving plan designed to provide an individual with retirement income (often paid in
a lump-sum) by collecting and investing a regular stream of contributions during the years of
employment.
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regressive, according to the Sri Lanka Integrated Survey, with over 70 percent of payments in the
SLIS sample going to households in the top two quintiles of expenditure distribution.
2.48 "Public Assistance". Sri Lanka's Public Assistance is a relatively well targeted set of
social assistance programs. Intended for the very poorest Sri. Lankans, its outcomes confirm that
program funds are in fact directed to this population. Several Public Assistance programs are
operated by the Social Service Department, Ministry of Social Services and Housing
Development. Programs provide assistance to persons with disabilities, the elderly poor (those
without sources of income), widows, foster parents of orphans, and persons with long-term
illnesses or paralysis. Single person households receive Rs. 100 per month; households with
dependants receive Rs. 300. A scheme of assistance to persons affected by tuberculosis, leprosy,
and cancer was recently introduced.23
2.49 Half of the total transfer envelope of this set of programs benefits the poorest 20 percent
of Sri Lankans, according to the Integrated Survey; 65 percent benefits the poorest 40 percent
(Table 2.10). Low-income households with disabled members as well as the low-income elderly
are more likely to receive funds from Public Assistance programs, according to the Integrated
Survey. The benefit size and coverage of Public Assistance programs, however, are low. The
benefit is equivalent to 8-23 percent of the per capita median income in Sri Lanka in 1999.
2.50 Administration of these programs is devolved to the provincial councils. Although the
Department of Social Services is still nominally responsible for evaluating them, few details are
available on their implementation. The 1999 expenditures of the Social Services Department
totaled Rs. 2,149 million (0.2 percent of GDP), with Rs. 1,740 million (81 percent of the total)
spent on actual transfers.24
2.51 Unemployment Programs. Two distinct groups in Sri Lanka are at high risk of
unemployment. The first is unskilled rural laborers, who face seasonal fluctuations in labor
demand; the second is so-called educated youth. The unemployment rate among young, educated
individuals-those with 0- and A-level university degrees-stood at 12.9 and 17.4 percent in the
first quarter of 1999 (Central Bank Annual Report, 2000). In the past the government has
attempted to deal with the youth unemployment problem by creating civil service jobs. This has
led to an increase in reservation wages of these unemployed, a proliferation of public sector jobs,
and grievances on the part of those who felt left out. A recent study of the Sri Lanka labor market
demonstrated that high reservation wages and queuing for lucrative jobs in the public sector are
the main reasons for high unemployment rates among educated youth.25 In Sri Lanka, less than 2
percent of poor households are unemployed.
23 The Social Services Department also assists victims of natural disasters.
24 Net of World Food Program (WFP) funds. The Department of Social Services and the CGES also
provide dry ration assistance (up to six months) to the low-income victims of natural disasters such as
drought, floods, earth slides, pests, wild elephant attacks, and outbreaks of malaria, as well as to people
in welfare camps. Property damage (up to Rs. 10,000) resulting from natural disasters is also covered by
grants from the Department of Social Services. Disaggregated figures on the amount of these transfers
are not available.
2 5 Based on findings of World Bank (1999) "Sri Lanka - A Fresh Look at Unemnployment" and Rama
(1994) "Flexibility in Sri Lanka's Labor Market."
-46 -
2.52 The government's latest response to unemployment has been to create export-processing
zones (EPZs) and boards of investment (BOI), which were expected to generate jobs in response
to tax concessions and to the shield protecting them from Sri Lanka's rigid labor regulations. The
large number of vacancies in these industries implies that tiiese jobs are considered undesirable
by the unemployed, in particular educated youth. White-collar public sector jobs-teaching,
Samurdhi administration-are more popular among graduates.
2.53 Other Programs. Several other government-operated transfer and subsidy programs
have certain safety net functions. Uniforms and textbooks are provided free of charge to school
children by the Ministry of Education and Higher Education. These programs are meant to
encourage school participation, but their operational efficiency could be clearly improved. In case
of schools uniforms, for example, distributing vouchers, rather than a uniform, could reduce
administrative overheads.
2.54 The fertilizer subsidy is considered in Sri Lanka to be a social transfer because it is
intended to benefit small-scale farmers. Sri Lanka produces very little chemical fertilizer
domestically (9 percent of the country's total consumption in 1997), and the subsidy is paid to
importers of chemical fertilizer. Fertilizer subsidies were in place for several decades after
independence, but in the beginning of 1990 they were discontinued for several years, reappearing
in 1994. Between 1994 and 1997 subsidies were given to a variety of fertilizers. Since 1997 only
the urea subsidy has remained in effect, with the purpose of "channeling the bulk of the benefits
of the fertilizer subsidy to the small farmers." The amount of the subsidy depends on the
difference between the purchase price and the fixed retail price envisaged for the Sri Lanka
domestic market.
2.55 The efficiency of the fertilizer subsidy is questionable on at least two grounds. First, 28
percent of all subsidized urea was used in 1999 in tea, rubber, and coconut production-to the
benefit of large producers. Second, in rice farning, the urea subsidy encourages overuse of this
fertilizer, which soon reduces yields (the so-called illusive green effect) and causes environmental
damage.
Private, Semi-formal, and Informal Safety Nets
2.56 Remittances. In Sri Lanka as in other countries households make their own arrangements
to secure their consumption flows. Foreign employment is an importance source of income for
many households. An estimated 5 percent of GDP is net income from abroad. Other types of
arrangements include remittances from friends ands relatives, use of village middlemen, and
savings. In the Sri Lanka Integrated Survey sample, slightly less then 5 percent of all households
reported receiving income from family members working abroad. Households from all income
strata receive labor income from abroad (Table 2.11). Variation in use of these methods stems
from geographic area of residence and ethnic origin. Moors are the most likely to report income
earned abroad (11 percent of households) followed by Sinhalese and Sri Lankan Tamil
households (8 percent each). Indian Tamil households have the fewest opportunities to earn
income abroad: Only 2 percent of households have members remitting income. Households in the
North Eastern and North Western provinces are the most likely to receive labor income from
abroad; households in Uva and Sabaragamuwa are the least likely.
2.57 Analysis of the 1999/2000 Sri Lanka Integrated Survey shows that well-off households in
Sri Lanka are more likely to receive transfers from abroad, whereas domestic remittances are
received by households from all strata (Tables 2.11 and 2.12). There is wide geographic variation
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in receipt of remittances. Foreign remittances are more likely to be received by households in the
Western and North Eastern regions, while households in Uva and Sabaragamuwa depend on
domestic remittances more than households in the other provinces: 14 and 20 percent of all
households in these two poorest provinces reported receiving domestic remittances.
Table 2.11: Incidence of Private Transfers and Migrant Labor Income
(percent)
1 5
Quintile (lowest) 2 3 4 (highest) Total
Labor income from abroad 4.7 5.7 5.4 3.8 4.1 4.7
Friends and relatives remittances from abroad 1.6 1.7 2.9 3.0 6.4 3.2
Domestic remittances from relatives and friends 9.4 9.6 9.9 10.6 10.6 10.0
Source: 1999-2000 Sn Lanka Integrated Survey; calculations from 3 quarters.
Table 2.12: Distribution of Private Transfers and Migrant Labor Income by Quintile
1 5
Quintile (lowest) 2 3 4 (highest) Total
Laborincomefromabroad 14 19 19 18 29 100
Friends and relaUives remittances from abroad 2 5 6 11 76 100
DomesUic remittances from relatives and friends 12 12 20 30 26 100
Source: 1999-2000 Sn Lanka Integrated Survey; calculations from 3 quarters.
2.58 Microfinance. An efficient financial market can help households deal with risk. The
welfare of the poor can be improved by including them in the financial system so that they have
access to high marginal returns on their investments, insurance to deal with the risks implicit in
their economic activities, and liquidity for consumption smoothing. Poor people save, but they do
not necessarily have access to deposit services or the opportunity to save enough to engage in
investment projects.
2.59 Studies have sought empirical evidence on the impact of microfinance services on
poverty by measuring whether access to microfinance increases levels of consumption or
decreases fluctuations in levels of consumption at the household level (Khandker 1998; Morduch
261998; Montgomery and others 1996). Increased investment via access to credit is expected to
raise household income (and consumption) and thereby reduce poverty as long as the investment
returns are in excess of the loan installment repayments. A temporary reduction in poverty is
expected to occur if credit or savings are used to smooth consumption by repaying existing debt,
improving housing, or addressing social obligations, thereby reducing household vulnerability to
26 The definition of microfinance and microfmance providers needs to be clarified to avoid confusion.
Generally, microfinance services comprise basic financial services that are specifically tailored for poor
clients. They have the following characteristics: small loans, typically for start-up business or working
capital; informal and quick appraisal of borrowers; collateral-free loans and use of collateral substitutes
such as group guarantees or comnpulsory savings; access to larger repeat loans based on sound repayment
performance; frequent monitoring of investment projects and repayment of installments; and small
amounts of savings.
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income shocks. There is growing evidence in the literature on the income-smoothing
(vulnerability-reducing) role of microfinance (Morduch 1998; Zaman 1999).
2.60 Formal microfinance providers are those chartered by the government or subject to
banking regulation and supervision. In Sri Lanka, they include public and private banks engaged
in commercial and development banking. Semiformal institutions are usually licensed by
different government ministries and include cooperatives and NGOs, as well as the credit
component of the government Samurdhi program. Informal financial institutions operate outside
the boundaries of any government regulation or supervision; they include self-help groups,
moneylenders, shopkeepers, and friends and family.27
2.61 The formal microfmance market is largely supply driven, as evidenced by various
government interest subsidies or refinancing schemes offered to the two state banks for rural
sector lending. The same situation exists in the semiformal market, where the government
supports the fast-growing credit component of the Samurdhi program (introduced earlier in this
chapter) known as Samurdhi Banking Societies (SBS). Most of the subsidized rural credit
programs have resulted in high arrears and have generated losses for the financial institutions
administering the programs and for the government. Evidence from other developing countries
show that government associated credit programs like Samurdhi also face the risk of failure due
to the potential for political capture of these programs.
2.62 Government subsidies and direct state involvement in microfmance through Samurdhi
crowd out other well-performing microfinance institutions that do not have access government
subsidies. Many NGOs use borrowed funds at market interest rates to on-lend to their clients but
have had to restrict their expansion and clientele to remain competitive. Heavy state involvement
in the microfinance sector also undermines credit discipline among borrowers, thereby imposing
additional credit risks onto these NGOs.
2.63 According to the Sri Lanka Integrated Survey, more than 70 percent of the country's poor
have access to some form of savings service, and about 26 percent borrow from various sources.
Similar distributions in saving and borrowing are also observed among relatively wealthier
households, thus indicating no systematic lack of access to financial services by poor people.
Among households that borrow, loan sources are distributed almost equally across all the
quintiles. Formal sources of loans are the largest among all groups, followed by informal sources
and then the semiformal institutions. Table 2.13 disaggregates household savings and borrowing
behavior across all households by per capita monthly expenditure quintiles.
2.64 Sri Lanka has unusually high levels of formal sector lending to the poor compared to
most developing countries. About 41 and 25 percent of loans to poor households are made by
formal and semiformal microfinance providers, respectively. The saving and borrowing patterns
of the population as a whole do not suggest that poor households are systematically excluded
from participating in the formal or semiformal financial market.
2.65 The level of poor people's participation in the formal financial sector distinguishes Sri
Lanka from most developing countries, where the informal sector is the primary source of credit
for poor people. The informal sector in Sri Lanka does provide access to financial services, in
27 The term "microfinance institution" is used when referring to an organization that claims to be providing
microfinance services. It is hard to establish, based on the data available, which institutions are strictly
providers of microfinance services and which are not.
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particular short-term consumption loans (Box 2.4). But the role of the formal sector is also
important. Not only do poor households in Sri Lanka have access to credit and mortgage facilities
from various institutions, but they can also chose to draw down their savings to meet income
shocks. Poor households are therefore better prepared to manage their risks than their
counterparts in other developing countries.
Box-2.4 The Role of the'Middleman in the Rural Economny
The village middleman has awide;presence in the village-economy and is said to 'trap' poor households in acircleof debt. In some
cases,.the:client-patron relationship allows a.village lender to:establish a nionopolistic preserice.and earn-corrdsponding.profits. A
do6er,examtination reveals thatn middlemen serve a series of essential purposes;-A gvernrnment would be short-sighted&iflt'ied to
break -this relationship by regulating village lenders or-by providing subsidized credit. Regulations do not usually work inthe informal
econormy, and the.risk assessmerik monit6ring,:and enforcement capabilities of a state-agent are by'far_ihferior.to those of a.village
lender. -Public.policy action thatVcouldinfluence this patron-client relationship should airnat bringing changes to the' structure of.the
village market4for example, by f6stedrig- the emergence of competitofr with a stable presence; Improvements in;r6ads and other
types of communications infrastructure-are-examples of such types of policies. In additiori, strengthening NGO-based initiatives in
which peer'groups.perform monitoring and enforcement roles should improve.the competitive trhctureof the 'village credit markets.
The middlerman (mudalahl) in the Sri Lankan' rral economy fills muliple roles and'Is'gen4I y,viewed-with ambivalencetby the rural
population. The mudalali offers a supply of consumer goods- and inputs on credit and purchases produce at the farrm gate. His
fu'nctionsincludethe supply of agricultural inputs, retail trade in consumer goods, provisioh oftransport'services and ofcredit;'and
purchase-of produce, particularly paddy crops. The.control of:this wide range.of essential functions by.a single ageht has all6wed
the mudalalito consolidate!an advantageous position vis-a-vis the small farmer. Srallifarmers,particulardy in isolated 'areas, depend
h'eavily:on one,or avery few traders.for inputjci6dit,jan uninterrupted supply of corisumer goods,.anid saleof farmmproduce.,During
lean seasons,particularly before harvests; many are dependenton credit from the-local-mudalali shopkeeper for basic staplefood'
items or, earlier in the season, for agricltural'inputs such as'fertilizer andI'pesticides.Under the terms of a commoh unwrttep
agreement, smaill farmers are expected to'sell their'produce to the shopkeeper.who has extended. them credit:As a result ` they are
often-'compelled to ;pay abeve-market prices for. inputs and other commodities .while receiving below-market prices for their farmm
produce, experiencin'g highlyunfavorable terms.of tfade in 'the process. Farmers.find-itdifficult to.shop,for better offers:ldcally, since
options are-few and they will be refused credit during the next lean season if they seli to any retailer other-than their:customary
creditor. The small number-of traders and:thetremoteness of some areas results'ina near monopoly ontheservices traders offer.
Efforts to substitute government-sponsored programs and institutions for the mudaiali'have generally beeri unsuccessful. Many-
farmers indicated that they are aware that:the middlemen play an important role, that mudalalis-are' more efficient than institutional
lenders in;tenis of providing credit;and services when needed>' and that.their profits reflect the-risks they take. At best, sniall
producers sometimes viewthe rmiddlemen as a reliable source of help arid'protectionr. Efforts by the govemrnent to eliminate.
middlemen.inr the rural-economy.are unrealistic and of questionable-wisdom, given the'varied functi6nsithey perform in production
and marketing.
Source- Based on Parker and Silva (2000).
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Table 2.13: Patterns in Household Saving and Borrowing
(percent)
Quintle 1 2 3 4 5 Total
(lowest) (highest)
Households that save with formal and 71 74 77 81 88 79
semiformal institutons
Households that saved but did not 71 66 61 58 53 60
withdraw from formal and semiformal
institutions over the last 12 months
Households that have loans outstanding 25 23 28 30 30 28
Borrower households that borrow from 24 26 26 21 17 23
semiformal institutions
Borrower households that borrow from 418 41 39 45 57 45
formal institutons
Borrower households that borrow from 35 34 34 34 27 32
informal sources
Households that mortgaged assets over 13 16 20 17 14 16
the last 12 months
Note: Expenditure quintles are based on per capita spending. As a result the number of households is different in each column.
Source: 1999/2000 Sri Lanka Integrated Survey, calculations from three quarters.
2.66 Poor people in Sri Lanka tend not use their savings for liquidity management purposes.
According to the Sri Lanka Integrated Survey, more than 70 percent of poor households that
saved did not withdraw any of their savings. During extensive discussions, many poor households
from Kalpitiya in Puttlam district who were members of Isuru Societies-organized as part of the
central bank-sponsored Small Farmers and Landless Credit Project-explained their preference
to use loans rather than their savings for household cashflow management. Savings are meant for
old age security and for their children's education. This notion of saving for the future is also
captured by patterns of loan use by the poor.
2.67 Data on the use of loans suggests that poor households that borrow use most of their
loans to meet household consumption needs rather than for investment activity (Table 2.14). The
second most popular use of credit by the poor is to improve housing conditions. This confirms the
bias expressed by the households in Kalpitya toward using loans to smooth household
consumption. Household saving and borrowing patterns indicate that poor people are forward-
looking users of microfinance. As part of their risk management strategy poor households save
for the future and use credit to smooth current household expenditure.
2.68 Nothing in the patterns of household saving and borrowing suggests that poor households
are systematically excluded from participating in the financial market. Poor households share the
same distribution of formal, semiformal, and informal loans as all other households. There
appears to be no substance to the opinion expressed by many officials in interviews that poor
people need to be "taught how to save." The government will be short-sighted if it does not
recognize the inherent ability of poor people to manage their household cash flow through various
means, saving being one of them. The government's focus should, therefore, be to safeguard poor
people's savings and to ensure that they have access to them in case of need.
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Table 2.14: Uses of Loan
(percent)
1 2 3 4 5 Total
Quintile (lowest) (highest)
Business or farm use
Purchase of raw materials 9 9 8 9 12 10
Purchase of equipment 2 4 4 7 6 5
Purchase of land 0 0 0 3 2 1
Purchase of animals 4 3 2 1 1 2
Building improvement 2 5 5 4 8 5
Otherbusiness/farmuse 10 15 14 13 14 13
To pay workers 0 0 0 0 0 0
Personal use
households consumption 31 26 29 19 14 23
Purchaserimprovement of dwelling 27 28 22 29 29 27
Mariage/family event 1 2 2 2 3 2
Consumer durables 1 2 4 3 4 3
To settle another loan 1 1 1 2 5 1
Other personal use 13 4 9 7 1 8
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: 1999/2000 Sr Lanka Integrated Survey, calculatons from three quarters.
2.69 To what extent are government directed credit programs useful and a good use of public
resources? There are several shortcomings in some of the larger targeted credit programs. Despite
interest and refinance facilities, recovery rates of two of the largest programs implemented by the
Bank of Ceylon-the New Comprehensive Rural Credit Scheme (NCRCS) and the Surathura
Diriya Credit Programme (SDCP)-were 76 and 67 percent. By contrast, the recovery rate of the
Bank of Ceylon's Small Enterprise Development Programe, which used the Bank's own funds,
28had a recovery rate of 81 percent despite charging a higher interest rate
2.70 NCRCS provides short-term loans for farmers to cultivate paddy crops and other
subsidiary food crops. At the end of 1999, this program cost the government Rs. 68 million in
interest subsidy paid to the implementing banks, and Rs. 117 million in expenses incurred by the
central bank under the provisions of its Credit Guarantee Scheme. The cumulative loss incurred
by the government and the central bank under the program through the end of 1999 was Rs.343
million (Central Bank Annual Report 1999).
2.71 The Surathura program is targeted toward promoting self-employment through
microenterprise among unemployed youth. Preliminary findings of a survey of defaulters reveal
that poor identification of borrowers was a key reason for low recovery rates. Even loans offered
to Samurdhi welfare recipients under the SASANA and SAVANA programs via the Bank of
28 Most targeted program offer an on-lending rate of 10 percent per annum while the SED program charged
13.5 percent per annum (Central Bank Annual Report 1999; Bank of Ceylon Report on Development
Credit Schemes 2000).
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Ceylon and Peoples' Bank had recovery rates of 74 and 73 percent. Targeted credit programs in
Sri Lanka, therefore, appear to be no exception to the general experience of similar programs
elsewhere-low recovery rates, poor identification of borrowers, low incentives for bank officials
to recover loans, and low incentives for borrowers to repay. Although loans from state banks are a
key source of credit for poor households (see Table 2.15), the performance of these programs
suggests that they are mostly supply driven and impose substantial costs on the govermment.
2.72 Although they were intended to be a different type of financial institution, the Samurdhi
Banking Societies (SBS) cannot be differentiated from the two state banks in the way they
operate. Even though the recovery rate of SBS loans is reported to be 104 percent, it is not clear
whether that rate is indicative of the quality of loan performance or of other idiosyncrasies of the
program. For example, access to Samurdhi food stamps is conditional on loan repayment.
Because money is fungible, one could argue that what is being observed is simply a net re-
transfer of Samurdhi food stamps in the form of loan repayments. Further, SBS has only been in
operation since 1997, but has increased its portfolio size by 600 percent. Such a high level of
expansion in itself raises concem about SBS's institutional base and its capacity to maintain the
same level of performance, especially in terms of assessing credit risks and monitoring
investments. There is no guarantee that over time people, will not come to view Samurdhi loans
as government transfers that need not be repaid, therefore inviting complete capture by "willful"
defaulters as was the case in India.
2.73 Another cause for concern is SBS's recent acquisition of Pan Asia Ltd., a commercial
bank. It is not yet clear what business Samurdhi intends to conduct through this acquisition and
what it all means for poor depositors. Should SBS become insolvent under any circumstance, the
government will have to foot the bill using billions of rupees that SBS owes to poor savers. As of
the end of June 2000, SBS owed its members Rs. 2 billion in voluntary savings and Rs. 5 billion
in compulsory savings due to mature within 12 months.
2.74 Because SBS and the two state banks have access to government resources, they may
crowd out the more market-oriented semiformal institutions, mainly small NGOs, that operate
using funds borrowed on local capital markets. For example, the Arthacharya Foundation, an
NGO that provides microcredit services to a client base of 3,000, borrows from various private
commercial banks and other sources at an average cost of about 14 percent. It is no surprise that
NGOs like the Arthacharya Foundation remain minuscule in terms of their coverage when
compared to the state banks and Samurdhi, or that they target both poor and nonpoor households
to diversify risks and minimize costs (Table 2.15).
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Table 2.15: Distribution of Number of Loans by Source (percent)
1 2 3 4 5 Total
Quintile (lowest) (highest)
Relatves 10 6 6 6 6 7
Friends 9 14 15 14 9 12
Landlord 1 1 0 0 0 0
Employer 2 1 3 4 0 4
Shopkeeper 6 4 4 2 1 3
Money lender 7 8 6 7 3 6
Pawnbroker 1 0 0 1 0 1
NGOs 2 2 4 2 2 2
Samurdhi Bank 10 9 6 5 2 6
SANASA 7 8 8 8 5 7
Community bank 4 5 7 7 5 5
Commercial bank 27 27 26 26 39 30
Other insfitutons 11 14 8 8 10 8
Source: 1999-2000 Sr Lanka Integrated Survey, calculabons from three quarters.
2.75 The larger semiformal microfinance institutions, cooperative rural banks, SANASA, and
Sarvodaya Economic Enterprises Development Service (SEEDS) are all based on a federated
three-tier cooperative structure. These institutions largely rely on member savings and donor
grants for their operations. None lends exclusively to the poor. For instance, SANASA is more of
an institution for the "middle class", an assessment endorsed by people tinterviewed for this
report. All of these institutions mobilize substantial amounts of savings from their members. For
example, the cooperative rural banks showed the highest ratio of deposits to credits (20.7),
followed by SEEDS at 4.62 (Table 2.16). The deposit-to-credit ratio would have been higher for
SANASA except that part of its deposit base is used to build the capital base of SANASA
Development Bank. It is no surprise that all four institutions have plans to "graduate" into the
formal financial sector given their strong liquid bases.
Table 2.16: Deposits and Advances Selected Semiformal Institutions, at end 1999
Deposits Loans Deposit-to-credit
(Rs. millions) outstanding ratio
(Rs. millions)
Cooperative rural banks 12915 623 20.7
SEEDSa 573 124 4.62
Thrift and credit cooperaUve societies 4238 2033 2.08
(SASANA)
Samurdhi Banking Societiesb 1957 1685 1.16
Total 43831 4465 9.82
a. As at end September 2000
b. As at end June 2000
Source: Annual reports and statistical tables provided by each institution
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Programs Sponsored by Nongovernmental Organizations and International Organizations
2.76 Many local and intemational NGOs provide elements of a safety net in Sri Lanka. Sewa
Lanka and Sarvodaya-two local NGOs-have a large presence in the districts of the North East.
Sewa Lanka works on several projects in the conflict zone, both in "cleared" and "uncleared"
areas, including supply of temporary shelters, agricultural relief project for resettling populations,
supplementary food for the displaced and resettling, and rehabilitation and development (tree
planting and microcredit). Sarvodaya is involved in construction or repair of basic sanitation
facilities, schools, and roads and in making in-kind and monetary transfers for the purpose of
building income-generating activities. It also conducts health and nutrition training and operates
medical clinics for mothers and children and early childhood development centers.
2.77 The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is the main UN
coordinating and implementation agency for ensuring protection of the displaced population.
UNHCR implements its activities directly and indirectly by providing project assistance.29 This
assistance is aimed at facilitating the resettlement and reintegration of the displaced. Many local
and intemational NGOs and UN agencies are partners in this effort.30
29 UNHCR's Country Strategy for Sri Lanka 2000-01 (UNHCR 2000).
30 The World Bank's own North East Irrigated Agriculture Project (NEIAP) is a five-year, $32 millioi
initiative that is expected to assist war-affected conmunities in the North and East.
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Chapter 3
Elements of A Strategy to Accelerate Poverty Reduction
3.1 Over the last tbree years, the Government of Sri Lanka has made an extraordinary effort
to deepen its understanding of the nature and root causes of poverty in Sri Lanka, including in the
areas directly affected by the conflict, with a view to reassessing and reformulating its policy
framework for reducing poverty. The Government's Framework for Poverty Reduction paper
presented to donors at the Development Forum in December 2000 signals a welcome shift in the
government's poverty reduction strategy. The paper, a product of recent analytical work and of a
broad consultation process within Sri Lanka, indicates the need to rely more on economic
opportunities and growth than on redistribution to reduce poverty; to correct inefficiencies and
inequities in the social protection system, in particularly in the Samurdhi program; to empower
the poor through improved governance; and to achieve a peaceful resolution to the civil conflict.
More recently, and on the basis of President Kumaratunga's Vision for the 21St Century (August
1999) and the Budget Policy Statement of 2001, the Government initiated preparation of a
"Vision 2010" to be discussed with civil society, donors and the private sector for determining the
country's long-term development goals and strategic priorities. In addition, an island-wide
consultative process was launched to collect the views of key stakeholders on how the
Government, civil society, and the donor community could work together on improving relief and
rehabilitation in war-affected areas, develop a code of operation, coordination and institution
building, and promote reconciliation and peace building.
3.2 Sri Lanka's experience confirms cross-country evidence that a sustainable reduction in
poverty can be achieved only through a continued period of rapid growth. Extensive poverty
programs can help the poor in the short run-though they are costly and difficult to target-but in
the medium and long run, only policies that trigger fast, private-sector-led growth, combined with
the removal of restrictions on the mobility of labor and land, can produce significant and
sustained reductions in poverty.
3.3 Tackling poverty in Sri Lanka, therefore, will not be achieved by adding a government
program here or there. Reducing poverty will require all policies, expenditures, and programs to
be evaluated for their impact on the livelihoods of the average household and on the poorest Sri
Lankans. Three broad areas of action are crucial to reducing poverty and raising per capita
incomes: creating a policy that is conducive to raising the incomes of the poor, providing
effective public services that reach the poor in the core areas of government responsibility, and
finding a peaceful resolution to the conflict.
Creating a Policy Environment that Facilitates Poverty Reduction
3.4 Households and individuals best escape poverty and reduce vulnerability to downward
shocks through their own efforts. Public policies can either encourage or discourage those efforts.
A policy framework that helps accelerate growth (in agriculture and other areas), increase real
wages, expand employment, and limit inflation will create an environment for poverty reduction.
Fundamentals of economic management, discussed in reports from the World Bank and others on
Sri Lanka, highlight the importance of prudent fiscal management, financial sector restructuring,
outward-oriented trade and investment policies, and a transparent climate for investors large and
small. Monitoring the impact of reforms on households, in particular the poor, should continue to
be a part of the government's agenda.
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3.5 Fiscal constraints mean tougher choices. The fiscal situation in Sri Lanka has been a
concern throughout the 1990s, with the deficit remaining between 8 and 10 percent of gross
domestic product (GDP). Efforts were made during the decade to contain expenditures, despite
increasing defense and interest outlays. In 2000 those efforts were frustrated by the escalation of
the war, which caused security-related expenditures to reach 5.6 percent of GDP. If the public
budget is to benefit the poor, the government needs to examine the pattern of spending across and
within sectors, look hard at what tax concessions and subsidies can be eliminated, and design a
pattern of expenditures-not only poverty programs-that emphasizes the poor. In Sri Lanka, the
fiscal costs of even untargeted direct subsidies-such as the rice rations of the 1 950s, the food
stamps of the 1970s, and the Janasaviya and Samurdhi programs of the 1990s-are dwarfed by
the costs of bank restructuring and investments in loss-making public enterprises. This highlights
the need for an overall analysis of public expenditure patterns from a poverty perspective.
3.6 Accelerating Deregulation and Privatization. To increase growth the pace of structural
reform must also increase. In Sri Lanka, reforms to privatize and deregulate the economy, and to
remove distortions in markets and prices, remain unfinished. This may help explain the low rates
of return on investment in Sri Lanka compared to East Asian comparator countries (Ahmed and
Ranjan, 1995). Although some reduction in state control has occurred in recent years through the
divestiture of state-owned enterprises and fiscal retrenchment, the state still intervenes im many
production and trading activities, crowding out more efficient private initiative. The business
environment is constrained by the inadequate adjustments over the years of public institutions,
public policies, and the regulatory framework to the needs of the market economy. As a result,
the private sector, has not developed to its full potential.
3.7 Policies for Agricultural Growth. In the long run, the sources of sustained growth and
poverty reduction will continue to be manufacturing and services. Facilitating the growth of and
mobility of resources into these sectors should.continue to be a priority. In the short and medium
run, however, many of the poor will continue to remain engaged in agriculture. Increasing
productivity and returns to labor in agriculture is, therefore, key for poverty reduction in the short
run. Currently, agricultural policy, including the trade regime of agricultural inputs, technology,
and outputs, is a serious constraint to reducing increasing returns to farming.
3.8 Trade policy for agricultural outputs and inputs must be made more consistent and
transparent. Although Sri Lanka followed a relatively open international trade regime in the
1990s, trade policy on agricultural goods and foodstuffs has been unpredictable, contributing to
the volatility of farmers' incomes and distorting production decisions. Import tariffs for
agricultural produce are often changed ad hoc, and the market interventions of the state-owned
Cooperative Wholesale Establishment (CWE) further introduce sharp variations in output prices.
This inconsistent and uncertain trade policy has led to large and unpredictable variations in the
quantity of imports of major food commodities-including rice, onions, chilies, and potatoes-
and thus on the prices Sri Lankan farmers can charge for those commodities. The import regime
also discourages the private sector from investing in food commodity processing and storage,
leaving the activity solely to the government. CWE is a large parastatal engaged in wholesaling,
storing, and retailing of a wide range of consumer goods, including major food commodities. In
1999 it accounted for about 40 percent of total rice imports and about 15-20 percent of total
imports of other major food commodities to Sri Lanka. A dynamic private sector can perform
more effectively the functions that CWE is meant to perform.
3.9 Flexible Land Markets. The experiences of East Asia, especially Indonesia and Thailand,
have shown that an efficient land market is a key ingredient for high growth rates in agriculture.
Increasing agricultural incomes and productivity in Sri Lanka will require improving access, use,
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and tradability of land and reducing government involvement in agricultural marketing. The land
market in Sri Lanka is constrained by the state's role as dominant landlord, restrictions on land
sale and use in some areas, and inadequate land registry. State control over land, along with ill-
defined property rights and tight restrictions on transferability and use of land restrict farmers'
ability to obtain credit, move, or sometimes shift into higher value crops.31 Land policies aimed at
distributing land equitably among the peasant class have fostered small-holder agriculture with a
subsistence orientation.
3.10 Successive measures of land tenure, particularly in the paddy sector, have been
introduced in Sri Lanka since the early 1950s. These have established strong state control over
land but not clearly defined property rights. Land has been distributed to improve food production
and as a means by which indentured workers could earn income.
3.11 The state still dominates land ownership in Sri Lanka, owning between 60 and 80 percent
of the land in the country. Two-thirds of state-owned land is farmed by private farmers under
varying tenure arrangements. Tenancy arrangements vary in their restrictions on land use and
transfer, ranging from very restrictive leases to land grants. Even land grants, which convey title
permanently, have transfer restrictions-the government must give its permission before a sale
can take place. Two Land Reform Acts, passed in 1972 and 1975, vested a total of one million
acres of private and plantation lands in the state. About 20 percent of that land was distributed to
the landless in quarter-acre to one acre lots. Between 1920 and 1985, an additional 1.8 million
acres of state land were distributed to landless families under various land settlement projects.
Another 250,000 acres were added under the Mahaweli Program and other irrigated-settlement
projects in the form of village expansion and regularization of spontaneous settlements. Arable
land in large irrigation systems in the dry zone is owned by the state, which cedes rights to farm
the land to settlers under the land development ordinance permit system. The system permits
transfers from one generation to the next, but sales and other land transactions are prohibited. As
a result, land markets in major irrigation schemes are nonfunctional-a major long-term
constraint for intensification of agriculture.
3.12 Other deficiencies in land administration include documentation, transfers, and the use of
land as collateral for mortgages. The Colombo Land Registry has very limited capacity and is
unable to cope with the rapidly growing volume of transactions. Land market restrictions limit the
transferability of leases and freeholdings, cause distortions, encourage illegal rent-seeking, and
increase transaction costs. Land administration problems also affect the system of property
taxation, limiting municipal revenue and the availability of land required for infrastructure and
other development purposes. Another casualty of ill-defined property rights and weak land
administration is labor mobility.
3.13 Flexible Labor Markets. For growth to be effective in reducing poverty, the poor need
to be able to earn fair returns on their assets and outputs. Excessive restrictions make Sri Lanka's
labor and land markets inflexible, preventing labor, capital, and land from being allocated to more
productive uses and limiting returns on assets. Labor laws restrict the scope and range of labor
contracts, and the state remains an active employer, paying above-market wages, encouraging
queuing and often acting as an employer of last resort. The state owns between 60 and 80 percent
of the land in the country and holds a quasi-monopoly in education-around 95 percent of
31The government may also have feared a scenario in which indebted farmers would be compelled to
mortgage or sell their land and thereby revert to landlessness. By preventing farmers from having full
ownership of their land, however, land policies may have kept returns to farming low.
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schools are government run. These distortions constrain growth and contribute to the persistence
of poverty.
3.14 Sri Lanka's labor regulations should be made more flexible to encourage private sector
growth and job creation. The Termination of Employment and Workmen Act is one of the most
restrictive job-security regulations in the world. It protects all workers who have job tenure of at
least one year in establishments with 15 or more staff. Under the legislation, termination is
possible only with prior written consent of the employee or the commissioner of labor. Just as
damaging is the fact that the process of obtaining the commissioner's consent is nontransparent,
with dispute resolution taking several months and sometimes years, during which time the firm
must continue paying the salary of its redundant worker. One of the consequences of the existing
labor legislation is that firms in the informal sector prefer to remain small and not graduate to the
formal sector. This impedes economies of scale and job creation.32
3.15 The government has attempted to ease the restrictions by creating export processing
zones and providing special concessions through the Board of Investment, but these moves have
provided only partial solutions, and only to large enterprises located near Colombo. For smaller
enterprises and those located away from the capital, the inflexible labor legislation continues to
impose high costs.
Providing Effective Core Public Services That Reach the Poor
3.16 In the interest of long-term, sustained poverty reduction, the government must continue to
be involved in basic health and education, and improve its delivery of basic infrastructure and
social assistance-all core public services that form another area of action for poverty reduction.
3.17 Infrastructure for connectivity and integration. Regional disparities in the incidence of
poverty in Sri Lanka reflect, at least partly, the lack of a coherent strategy to integrate and
develop different regions of Sri Lanka. Improved provision roads, energy, water and sanitation,
and other types of infrastructure is needed to support the development of manufacturing and
services in rural areas. One of the most significant problems is the absence of a good road
network connecting major supply areas to demand centers, which limits not only non-farm
growth, but also limits the ability of farmers to switch to higher value-added crops or expand
nonfarm activities.
3.18 Compared to countries at a similar Table 3.1: Urban Population, Sri Lanka and
stage of development, Sri Lanka is a more Comparative Countries
rural economy. Only about one fourth of
the population lives in urban areas (see Per Capita Urban
Table 3.1). Better roads, energy, water and ($US) Population (%)
sanitation, and other infrastructure are Albania 750 38
needed in rural areas and linking these to Bolivia 950 62
faster growing urban centers to support China 860 32
incomes. Sri Lanka's rising regional Georgia 840 59
disparities in the incidence of poverty Sri Lanka 810 23
reflect at least partly the lack of a coherent Source: Word Bank WDR.
regional development strategy. The poor
quality of infrastructure-including electricity, water, transport, and communications between
32 Department of Census and Statistics conducted a survey of industries in 1995, which showed that a
staggering 97 percent of the 133,000 finms surveyed in the rural sector employed less than 15 workers.
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supply centers and markets-limits the switch to higher-value-added crops in agriculture and the
expansion of non-farm activities. One of the most significant problems is the absence of a good
road network connecting major supply areas to demand'centers. Instead, rural roads, many
inadequately maintained, absorb budgetary resources already limited by rising defense
expenditures. The absence of rapid access to markets increases transport costs, and as a result
prices of goods and even unskilled wages vary sharply across regions.
3.19 As in other areas, "more investment in infrastructure" is not the answer, at least not by
itself. Infrastructure must be designed to support welfare through income creation and improved
living standards. Funds are wasted when infrastructure and related measures to improve mobility
and access miss their targets, when things break down due to poor materials or workmanship, and
when the beneficiaries are incapable of using or maintaining the goods and services provided.
Adequate funding for operations and maintenance of priority infrastructure, increasingly crowded
out by defense spending, needs to be ensured. Top-down approaches have often led to such
outcomes. Improved governance-including a leaner, better organized, and more accountable
public administration, a more effective budget process,,and a stronger local administration-can
help improve the level and quality of basic services to the poor.
3.20 Quality public education services. Improving the quality of other publicly provided
services, such as education and health, can help the poor acquire knowledge and skills valued by
the labor market. At present, there is a perception that the quality of education is declining. There
is a growing shortage of teachers in mathematics, the sciences, and other basic disciplines. In
many rural areas these subjects-considered vital to employability-are poorly taught or not
taught at all. Class sizes in poor communities are often twice those in wealthier ones. Schools in
war-affected areas, border villages, and isolated areas find it particularly difficult to obtain
qualified teachers. Poor education for the children of poor households today will result in more
poverty and inequality tomorrow.
3.21 In the past, education policies may have reinforced social divisions and had powerftil
redistributional implications. Appropriately modified, education and language policy could be a
powerful force for social cohesion and poverty reduction. Currently, education is provided in
either Sinhala or Tamil, the two official languages, according to the ethnicity of the parents.
Students do not typically choose the language in which they leam;. Sinhalese are not required to
learn Tamil, nor are Tamils required to learn Sinhala. English, a bridge language, is used as a
medium of instruction in a few private schools, most located in Colombo. English is the language
of the private sector, and students from upper-class homes in which English is spoken are at a
premium in the labor market. English is also the language of instruction for many high-demand
university degrees, such as medicine and engineering. The country's language policy severely
restricts the ability of children of poor households to obtain better-paid jobs in the growing areas
of the economy.
3.22 Effective and affordable safety nets for the most vulnerable For the majority of the
population, including many of the poor, government policy can be most effective by helping the
poor help themselves. Untargeted subsidies and large income support programs, such as
Samurdhi, are costly and ineffective in reducing poverty sustainably. Basic assistance and
income support through well-targeted safety net programs would still be required for four groups
of vulnerable people. These are: (i) a small group of people likely to remain chronically poor
(orphans, the physically disabled, and elderly and widows without family and kinship ties),
because they cannot take advantage of existing opportunities; (ii) people "trapped" in pockets of
poverty because they face constraints to mobility and integration in the short run, such as estate,
irrigation and resettlement colony populations; (iii) people affected directly by the war, through
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death of breadwinner, injury, displacement, and loss of assets; (iv) people affected by catastrophic
risk, such as floods or severe droughts, for whom the best public policy is the promotion of a
combination of risk prevention and coping support. A larger group of people who experience
intermittent periods of ill health or unemployment may require a temporary cushion that enables
and encourages them to return to productive activity.
3.23 An effective safety net should help prevent a very low standard of living by reducing and
mitigating downside socioeconomic risk or coping with its occurrences; it should not create
dependence or discourage individual effort. In its current form, the Samurdhi program fails to
meet this standard. Furthermore, economic theory as well as cross-country evidence from
developing countries indicate that transfer programs like Samurdhi cannot achieve sustained
reductions in poverty.
3.24 For purposes of identifying beneficiaries of government safety net programs, inferring
need through means testing alone, as the Samurdhi program attempts to do, is always difficult. In
Sri Lanka, it has lead to leakages, thus becoming costly, and become subject to capture by ethnic
or political groups, thus undermining social cohesion. A more effective and affordable set of
safety net programs could use a combination of methods of identification, including categorical
and means testing criteria (for the chronically poor), geographical criteria (for those in pockets of
poverty or affected by catastrophic risk), and self-targeting (for all groups). Geographical
transfers to estate populations and others should not, however, replace efforts to remove the
obstacles to social and economic integration suffered by these communities. Revamping the
safety net program in this way would serve the needs of the poor who cannot participate in the
growth process and reduce their vulnerability to negative shocks.
3.25 Geographically targeted, in-kind benefits could also help to address problems of low birth
weight, child malnutrition, and anemia. Children of households living in estates and resettlement
colonies should be targeted first. Part of these health problems are generally attributed not only
to low incomes, but also to low access of households living in estates and resettlement colonies to
water, sanitation, and other public services. Therefore, geographically targeted transfers need to
be complemented with improved delivery of these public services to households in estates and
resettlement colonies.
3.26 It is critical to alleviate conditions caused by the war. Government partnerships with
United Nations agencies have benefited war-affected populations in many countries, including Sri
Lanka. This report reiterates the recommendations of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees that resettlement can be a good strategy for securing livelihoods of refugees and
displaced persons, and that emergency relief in cash and in-kind care in refugee camps should
continue in the short term. Policy actions to remove restrictions on the mobility of people, goods,
and services are expected to help populations affected by the war.
3.27 Public administration. Improvements in service delivery will require a more effective
and accountable public administration. Sri Lanka has been compared favorably to other
developing countries for its progress on social development and its good public sector
management. However, the quality of governance appears to have deteriorated in recent years. Sri
Lanka's move to an open, market economy has not been accompanied by similar transformations
in the public administration. The public sector is large, costly, and inefficient. With 12 percent of
the labor force employed in government in 1999 (17 percent if the mixed sector is included), the
country has the largest bureaucracy per capita in Asia. Public sector workers with the lowest
levels of education on average earn almost twice the wages of their equivalents in the nonpublic
sector.
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The progressive weakening of public administration is due to several factors. First, spending for
new investments, maintenance, and operations has beeni crowded out by the high wage and
pension bill and by rising defense expenditures. While the wage bill has declined in recent years,
pensions have increased, and the total has remained at a high level: wages and pensions for the
central government alone account for about 5 percent of GDP and 19 percent of total central
government expenditure. Between 1986 and 1999 defense expenditures increased nearly three
fold in real terms. Second, the civil service suffers from severe skill and motivation problems.
Third, the machinery of government is antiquated, fragmented, and overly complex. Finally, the
Sri Lankan public administration is laboring under an increasing weight of political pressure and
influence, which is attributed by many to the abolition of the independent Public Service
Commission. 3 3
3.28 Sri Lanka has not yet realized many of the potential benefits of decentralization-
permitting local governments to make their own choices about what services to offer and how to
provide them. The design of decentralized government structures in Sri Lanka and the ways in
which those designs have been implemented inhibit high-quality, demand-driven service delivery
to all segments of the population, particularly the poor. This is due to two main problems. First,
inadequate attention has been paid to economic incentives associated with the fiscal aspects of
decentralization. Second, the central government has not withdrawn from the devolved, functions.
As a result, Sri Lanka has developed a highly complex framework of decentralization that has
created confusion and ambiguity regarding the roles and responsibilities of the elected and
administrative arms of government. This has reduced accountability and transparency, thereby
constraining the growth and maturation of decentralized government institutions.
Achieving Peace and Social Harmnony
3.29 Reducing poverty and human suffering requires an end to the civil conflict. The
consequences of the conflict are felt in every sphere of social and economic life. A study
conducted by the Institute of Policy Studies estimates the present-value cost of the conflict during
1984-96 at nearly 170 percent of Sri Lanka's total GDP for 1996. The Central Bank of Sri Lanka,
in its 1999 annual report, estimates that the conflict has reduced Sri Lanka's economic growth by
about 2 to 3 percentage points a year. There is a widespread feeling of despair and hopelessness
among youth, and Sri Lankan society has become more violent.
3.30 Socially divisive policies, initiated during colonial times and continued after
independence, have led to social fragmentation along ethnic and political lines. Because
institutions of the state and civil society have failed to offer forums for mediating intergroup
rivalries and forging cross-cutting ties among diverse ethnic groups, the ethnic cleavage led to
conflict, tearing Sri Lankan society and economy apart and leaving many vulnerable to poverty.
3.31 Ethnicity-distinguished primarily by language-and political affiliation have become an
accepted basis for competition for political power and for access to material resources. This social
fragmentation and the perception of group-based resource allocation have become an obstacle to
collective action that keeps the country from fulfilling its potential. Accelerating poverty
reduction and growth calls for policies that put national interests above narrow political or ethnic
interests. Policies that build social cohesion and economic integration should have a key role in
this strategy.
33 The Commission was restored in 1978, but without its original independence.
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Table Al. Poverty Measures for Selected Poverty Lines, 1985186-1995196
Poverty line 1985/86 1990191 1995196(in 1995196 prices) Incidence of Depth of Severity of Incidence of Depth of Severity of Incidence of Depth of Severity of
poverty poverty poverty poverty poverty poverty poverty poverty povertyRs. 633 17 4 1 9 2 0 12 2 1Rs.673 20 4 2 11 2 1 15 3 1Rs. 713 24 5 2 14 3 1 18 4 1Rs. 752 27 6 2 17 3 1 22 4 1Rs. 792 31 8 3 20 4 1 25 5 2Rs. 831 34 9 3 23 5 2 29 6 2Rs. 871 38 10 4 26 6 2 32 8 3Rs. 910 41 11. 4 29 7 2 36 9 3Rs. 950 45 13 5 33 8 3 39 10 4
Note: Reference poverty line is Rs. 792 per person per month at 1995/96 prices. Exdudes the North and East
Source: Gunewardena 2000.
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Figure Al. Incidence of Poverty in Sri Lanka for Reference Poverty Line and 20 Percent
Higher Poverty Line, 1985186- 1995196
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Source: Gunewardena 2000.
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Table A2. Incidence, Depth, and Severity of Poverty in Sri Lanka, by District, 1995196 (percent)
Incidence of poverty Depth of poverty Severity of poverty
District Index Contribution Index Contribution Index Contnibution
Lower poverty line (Rs. 792 per person per month)
Anuradhapura 33 6 6 5 2 4
Badulla 30 5 6 5 2 5
Colombo 10 6 2 4 0 4
Galle 25 6 6 7 2 7
Gampaha 11 5 2 4 0 3
Hambantota 27 4 5 4 2 3
Kalutara 26 7 6 7 2 7
Kandy 30 9 7 10 2 11
Kegalle 25 5 5 5 2 5
Kurunegala 34 12 7 12 2 12
Matale 35 4 9 4 3 5
Matara 28 6 6 6 2 6
Moneragala 49 5 14 7 6 9
Nuwara Eliya 21 4 4 3 1 3
Polonnaruwa 27 2 6 2 2 3
Puttalam 33 5 7 5 2 5
Ratnapura 37 9 8 9 3 9
Higher poverty line (Rs. 950 per person per month)
Anuradhapura 50 5 12 5 4 5
Badulla 48 6 12 5 4 5
Colombo 19 6 4 5 1 5
Galle 39 6 10 6 4 7
Gampaha 21 6 4 5 1 4
Hambantota 43 4 10 4 4 3
Kalutara 38 6 10 7 4 7
Kandy 42 8 12 9 5 10
Kegalle 41 5 10 5 3 5
Kurunegala 53 12 13 12 5 12
Matale 51 4 14 4 6 4
Matara 44 6 11 6 4 6
Moneragala 66 5 22 6 10 7
Nuwara Eliya 40 5 8 4 2 3
Polonnaruwa 40 2 11 2 4 2
Puttalam 51 5 13 5 4 5
Ratnapura 52 8 14 9 5 9
Note: Exdudes the North and East.
Sourne: Gunewardena 2000.
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Table A3. Poverty in Sri Lanka by Sector, 1985/86 to 1995/96
(percent)
Poverty line = Rs. 792 per person per Poverty line = Rs. 950 per person per
month month
Sector 1985/86 1990/91 1995/96 1985/86 1990/91 1995/96
Urban
Headcount 18 15 15 28 25 25
Poverty gap 4 3 3 8 6 6
Squared poverty gap 2 1 1 3 2 2
Rural
Headcount . 36 22 27 50 36 41
Poverty gap 9 5 6 15 9 11
Squared poverty gap 3 1 2 6 3 4
Estate
Headcount 21 12 25 35 28 45
Poverty gap 4 2 5 8 5 10
Squared poverty gap 1 1 2 3 2 3
Note: Excludes the North and East
Source: Gunewardena 2000.
Table A4. Contfibution to Poverty in Sri Lanka by Sector, 1985/86 to 1995/96
(percent)
Poverty line Rs. 792 per person per Poverty line Rs.950 per person per
month month
Sector 1985/86 1990/91 1995/96 1985/86 1990/91 1995/96
Urban
Headcount 12 16 8 13 16 9
Povertygap 12 18 8 13 16 8
Squared poverty gap 12 19 7 12 17 8
Rural
Headcount 83 80 88 81 79 87
Poverty gap 84 79 89 83 79 88
Squared poverty gap 85 78 89 84 79 89
Estate
Headcount 5 4 4 5 6 4
Poverty gap 4 4 3 4 4 4
Squared poverty gap 3 3 3 4 4 4
Note: Exdudes the North and East
Source: Gunewardena 2000.
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Figures A2 and A3. Agricultural Productivity in South Asian Countries, 1979-81
and Output per worker 1979-81 and 1996-98
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Figure A4. Number of Poor in Sri Lanka, by Province
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Table A5. Monthly per Capita Income and Expenditure in Sri Lanka, by Province, 199912000
Per capita Income Per capita Expenditure
Average Bottom quintile * Average Bottom quintile*
Western 2,464 1,126 2,728 875
Central 1,741 1,545 1,783 815
Southern 1,459 1,136 1,680 847
Northeastern 2,026 1,185 2,027 897
Northwestern 1,376 863 1,655 845
North Central 1,375 756 1,533 928
Uva 1,068 636 1,740 955
Sabaragamuwa 2,231 945 2,201 890
Source: Wodd Bank, based on 1999/2000 Sri Lanka Integrated Survey.
Figure A5. Daily Wages for Selected Tasks, by Province, 199912000
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Table A6. Incidence of Poverty by Education of Head of Household, 1985186 to 1995196
(percent)
Poverty line = Rs792 perperson Poverty line = Rs.950 per person
per month per month
Level of education 1985/86 1990/91 1995/96 1985/86 1990/91 1995/96
No schooling
Headcount 43 29 38 60 46 58
Povertygap 11 6 9 18 12 15
Squared poverty gap 4 2 3 7 4 6
Primary school
Headcount 41 26 34 57 41 51
Povertygap 11 5 8 17 10 13
Squared poverty gap 4 2 2 7 4 5
Lower secondary school
Headcount 29 19 27 44 33 43
Povertygap 7 4 6 12 7 11
Squared poverty gap 2 1 2 4 3 4
Upper secondary school
Headcount 22 15 20 35 26 33
Poverty gap 5 3 4 9 6 8
Squared poverty gap 2 1 1 3 2 3
GCE OAL
Headcount 8 7 10 15 13 17
Poverty gap 2 1 2 3 3 4
Squared poverty gap 1 0 1 1 1 1
GCEAIL
Headcount 6 4 4 7 5 8
Poverty gap 1 1 1 2 2 2
Squared poverty gap 0 0 0 1 1 1
Graduate and above
Headcount 1 2 1 5 3 3
Poverty gap 0 0 0 1 1 1
Squared poverty gap 0 0 0 0 0 0
Note: Excludes the North and East.
Source: Gunewardena 2000.
Table A7. Incidence of Poverty by Literacy Rate of Household Head, 1985/86 to 1995/96
(percent)
Poverty line = Rs. 792 per person Poverty line = Rs.950 per person
per month per month
Literacy status 1985/86 1990/91 1995/96 1985/86 1990/91 1995/96
Literate
Headcount 28 18 23 41 31 37
Poverty gap 7 4 5 11 7 9
Squared poverty gap 2 1 2 4 2 3
Illiterate
Headcount 45 30 38 61 46 56
Povertygap 12 7 9 19 12 15
Squared poverty gap 5 2 3 8 4 6
Note: Exdudes the North and East
Source: Gunewardena 2000.
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Figures A6 and A7. Access to Safe Water and Sanitation in Sri Lanka
Percent of population Percent of population
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Table A8. Model II-Probability of Receiving a Samurdhi Grant (Survey Probit Regression)
Standard Scaled
Varable Coefficient error coefficient Mean Std. Dev.
Number-of children 0-7 years old - -0.047 -0.042 -0.4Z0 0.391 0.647
Numberof children 8-17 years old 0.012 0.030 0.120 0.906 1.079
Number of elderly '0.026 0.044 0.260 .0.397 0.648
1, if no-men in the household 0.132. 0.090 1.320 0.097 0.296
Household size. 0.100 0.022 1.000 4.558 1.743
1, if disable household-member 0.206 :0.055 ' 2060 0.315 0.465
Type of settlement, traditional village omitted
1, if-inigation colony -0.419 '0.151 -4190 0.052 0.223
1, if expansion colony 0.114 0.190 1.140 0;058 0.235
1, if settlement scheme -0.023 0.118 -0.230 0.065 0.246
1, if plantation or estate -0.686 0.214 -6.860 0.034 0.181
1, if urban'iow income neighborhood -0.034 0.237 -0.340 0.012 0.110
1,. if urban mid;income neighborhoodd -0.351 .0.137 -3.510 0.074 0.262
Province, Westem omitted
1:, if Central 0.375 0.129. 3.750 0.166 0'372
1,if Southem 0.434 0.109- ;.340 0.175 0.380
1, if North Westem 0.450. 0.116 4.500o 0.123' 0.329
1, if North Central 0.455 0.139 4,550 0;086 0281
1,if-Uva .0408 ' 0.127' 4.0B0 0.092. 0.289
1,;if;Sabaragamuwa. 0.475 0.112 4.750: 0.1-20 0.325.
Ethnicity of the household head, Singhalese omitted
1, if-ethnicity:is:Sr Lankan.Tamil -0.515 0.126 -5.150- 0072 0.259
1, if-ethrnicity Indian Tamil -0.633 0.227. -6.330 0.024 0.152
1, if ethnicity-is:Moor -0.300 0.146 -3.000. 0.053: 0.224
1, if ethnicity is' other -0.352 0.397 -3.'520' 0.007 0.086
1, if household owns livestock -0.024 0.108 -0.240 0.078 0.268
1, if household owns assets -0.184 0.101 -1.840 0.297 0.457
Type of identification card, 'govemment ido omitted.
1,if"estatesid"card 0.118 0.158 1.180 0.029 0.168
1, if"other" card -0.109 0.111 -1.090 0.074 0.262
0.000
1, if memberin.themilitary o0.48 0.130 3.480- 0.047 0.211
Migration status, never moved omitted
1, if moved before 1950 0.186 0.179 1.860 0.027 0.164
1, if moved between 1950-70 0.145 0.105 1.450 0.092 0.289
1, if moved between 1970-93 -0.125 0.160 -1.250 0.013 0.115
1, if moved between 1993-95 -0.035 0.266 -0.350 0.006 0.078
1, if moved between 1995-99 0.172 0.273 1.720 0.013 0.113
continued on the next page
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Table A8. Model Il-Probability of Receiving a Samurdhi Grant (Survey Probit Regression), continued
from the previous page
Standard Scaled
Variable Coefficient error coefficient Mean Std. Dev.
1,if has land:title -0.481 0.101 -4.81-0 0.191 0.393
Land ownership, owned >1 acre omitted
1, if has no land 0.668 0.302 -6.680 0.295 0.456
1,;if has <1 acre own land 0.415 0.096- 4.150 0.179 0.383
1,jif uses plot rotation <1 acre -0.378 .0.418 -3.780 0.289 0.453
1, if uses-plot rotation >1 acre -0.697 0.724 -6.970 0.002 0.050
1, if uses operator rotation <1 acre -0.306 0.311 -3.060 0.290 0.454
Occupation of the household head, farm laborer omitted
1, if non-farm laborer -0:101 0.156' -1.010 0.168 0.374
1, if govemment employee -1.308 0.170 -13.080 0.090 0.286
1;-if private salaried employee -0.571 0;175 -5.710 0.070 0.255
1, if employed in estates -0.730 0.204 -7.300 0.038 0.192
1, if employed in petty. business -0.649 0.154 -6.490 0.107 0.309
1, if employed in domestic service -0.334 0.249 -3.340 0.012 0.108
1, if a farmer -0.372 0;155 -3.720 0.168 0.374
1, ifa.fishermen 0.022 0.238 .0.220 0.011 0.107
1, employed in other occupations -1.447 0.671 -14.470 0.003 0.057
1, if house duties only -0.345 0.156 -3.450 0.064 0.244
1,'if retired -0.730 0.163 -7.300 0.158 0.365
1, if disabled -0.166 0.211 -1.660 0;025 0.157
1l, if not working -0.539 0.190 -5.390 0.022 0.146
Years of education of the household head -0.058 0.010 -0.580 7.419 3.374
Type of house, own house omitted
1, if attached house -0.152 0.146 -1.520 0.047 0.211
1 if flat -0.249 0.-325 -2.490- 0.011 0107
1,-if'shanty 0.066 0.301 0.660 0.017. 0.129
1, if other type of housing -0.772 0.230 -7.720 ' 0.039 0.194
Type of latrine, own latrine omitted
1, if has no access to latnnes 0.238 0;094 2.380 0.094 0292
1, if has access to comm. latrine 0.053 0.151. 0'.530 0.040 0.196
Type of lighting used, electricity omitted
.1, if ino light 0.166 0.141 1.660 0.037 0.188
1, if use kerosenefor light .0.524 0.061 5.240 0.337 0.473
Log;household income, less Samurdhi -0.201- 0.030' -2.010 8.634 1.183752
Constant 1.323 0.285 13.230
Numberofobs =4761; Number of strata =2; F( 62, 262) =12.70; Prob> F= 0.0000
Note: Shaded if (ointly) significant at 5 percent level; absolute coefficient values in probit model cannot be interpreted
as marginal effects; scaled coefficients measure the effect of particular characteristics relative to the effect of
household size.
Source: 1999-2000 Sri Lanka Integrated Survey; calculations from three quarters, the North and East excluded.
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Historical Background on Safety Nets and Anti-Poverty Programs
1. The country's first food aid program-a rice ration-was introduced in 1939, under
British rule. After independence, the Sri Lankan government continued to distribute food. In the
1950s, it distributed two kilograms of rice each month, free of charge, to every Sri Lankan.
Between 1966 and 1979 expenditures on various food subsidy programs (rice, wheat flour, sugar)
amounted to 3-6 percent of GDP, or 8-17 percent of total government expenditures. In 1978, the
government made its first attempt to improve the targeting of food subsidies. Ration books were
issued to those in households that declared a monthly income of less than Rs. 300 (then $20) for a
family of five. Some 7.7 million individuals (55 percent of the population of the island) received
monthly ration books worth Rs. 15-25 per person.
2. In 1979 rationing was replaced by a food stamp program. This too was intended as a
targeted program, with eligibility based on means testing, and government officials were
instructed to scrutinize declarations of household income.34 The number of people declared
eligible under the food stamp program declined to 7.2 million, even though the estimated number
of individuals living in households with incomes of less than Rs. 300 was 3-4 million. Edirisinge
(1987) used data from the 1981-82 Consumer Finance and Socioeconomnic Survey to report that
50 percent of all households received this targeted assistance in 1981-82.35 Program outlays
accounted for 1-2 percent of GDP between 1979 and 1984.
3. The food stamp program was pro-poor, but suffered from substantial leakages and under-
coverage of poor households. Overall, 67 percent of program spending observed in the Consumer
Finance and Socioeconomic Survey sample went to households in the two poorest quintiles in
terms of per capita expenditure. The program had significant impact on food consumption by the
poor, representing 20 percent of the food spending of recipients in the lowest quintile and only 6
percent of the food spending of better-off recipients. In addition (and as economic theory would
predict), the program was shown to induce a reduction in recipients' work effort. Sahn and
Alderman (1996) showed that labor supply dropped by an average of 2.3-2.9 days per month in
response to the additional income represented by the food subsidy.
4. Throughout the 1980s other, smaller social assistance programs were added, and the
wheat flour subsidy was reintroduced. Some-the Integrated Rural Development Program
(IRDP), Triposha (a supplementary feeding program), Public Assistance (assistance to destitute
widows, disabled, elderly), kerosene stamps, an infant milk subsidy-were supplemented with
financing from external donors. Mid-day meals and school uniforms were provided to all school-
aged children beginning in the late 1980s.
5. Between 1989 and 1995, the Janasaviya program replaced food stamps as the country's
main antipoverty program. This targeted, means-tested program aimed to provide Rs. 2,500 in
monthly grants to half of all households in the country for two years. In practice, monthly grants
were fixed at Rs. 1,458 per household, comprising a consumption transfer of Rs. 1,000 and a
"savings" component of Rs. 458 intended for investment by the beneficiaries after the two-year
program period. In addition, a lump-sum grant of Rs. 25,000 was promised to beneficiaries at the
34 Means testing requires individual assessment of the means (income) of intended beneficiaries. Only
applicants with income below a certain threshold are eligible.
Edirisinghe (1987). Data from the Consumer Finances and Socioeconomic Survey 1981-82 collected by
Central Bank of Ceylon. The survey is a representative sample of Sri Lankan households comprising of
8,000 households in all provinces of the country. The survey was conducted between October 1981 and
September 1982.
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end of two years. To reduce budgetary pressures, the program was implemented in rounds. Only 4
of 11 rounds planned were implemented, and the lump-sum grant was replaced with a monthly
payment of Rs. 250. Social mobilization was a main implementation vehicle, and 6,000 social
mobilizers (animators) were employed to identify beneficiaries and boost community
participation activities.
6. In return for cash payments, beneficiary households had to provide 20 men days of labor
per month during the two-year period, which could be spent in training for private investment
projects of the beneficiaries themselves or working on community infrastructure projects. In this
regard Janasaviya resembled a public works program, but because it lacked a necessary element
of well-designed public works programs-self-targeting through lower-than-market wages-it
may have displaced other productive activities that beneficiaries might have undertaken. The
benefits provided were large in comparison with income levels, and thus may have created
disincentives to work and caused pressure on wages.
7. The targeting of Janasaviya was far from perfect. Results from the 1995-96 Household
Income and Expenditure Survey reported by the Department of Census and Statistics of Sri Lanka
(DCS) show that this transfer program was substantially pro-poor, but that it, too, had substantial
leakages and undercoverage.36 In 1995-96, 64 percent of all households in the lowest quintile,
and 9 percent in the top quintile received assistance. Prahdan (1999) confirmed the DCS results
by using the 1996-97 Consumer Finance Survey to show that 60 percent of program spending
accrued to the two lowest quintiles.3 ' Janasaviya outlays amounted to 0.7 percent of GDP in
1992.
36 "Household Income and Expenditure Survey 1995-96. Final Report." Department of Census and
Statistics, Ministry of Finance and Planning. The survey of 21,000 households in all areas outside of the
North East was conducted between November 1995 and October 1996. In 1996 Samurdhi had begun
op,erations in a few regions, and benefit distributions might reflect both Janasaviya and Samurdhi.
3 Pradhan (2000). The evaluation is based on 1996-97 Consumer Finance Survey, a survey of 9,000
households outside the North East, conducted by the Central Bank of Sri Lanka. The survey instrument
combined information about Janasaviya receipts with information about kerosene stamps.
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